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ABSTRACT
LEARNING FROM STRATEGICALLY CONTROLLED INFORMATION
Daniel N. Hauser
George J. Mailath
J. Aislinn Bohren
In the first chapter, “Promoting a Reputation for Quality,” I model a firm that
manages its reputation for selling high quality products by investing in the quality of
the product and by controlling the information consumers observe. As in Board and
Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013), quality is persistent, and evolves stochastically over time.
Consumers do not observe product quality or the firm’s actions directly, instead
they form beliefs about the quality of the firm’s product based on the information
they observe. I focus on two cases, the good news case, where the firm can promote
its product by releasing positive information, and the bad news case, where the
firm can choose to censor negative information, and characterize Markov perfect
equilibria.
In the good news case, promotion and investment are complements. The firm
has incentives to invest because it can then promote its product. the firm does
not invest in quality or promote at high reputation, invests and promotes at low
reputations, and promotes but does not invest at intermediate reputations. This
intermediate region reduces the firms incentives to invest in quality, relative to what
would happen if information was exogenous. But reputation effects are persistent.
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The firm will always eventually have incentives to invest in quality and renew its
reputation. In contrast, in the bad news case censorship and investment are substi-
tutes. The firm can either invest to hide negative information about its product or
censor this bad news. Unless censorship is sufficiently expensive, reputation effects
break down and the firm never invests in the quality of its product.
In the second chapter, “Bounded Rationality and Learning: A Framework and
A Robustness Result” (joint with Aislinn Bohren), we investigate how consumers
learn from the actions of others. We consider what happens in a social learning en-
vironment when agents have potentially misspecified models of the world. Agents
may misinterpret information they see about the world, and may also misinterpret
how others view the world. We develop a set of tools that allow us to analyze asymp-
totic learning outcomes in the presence of model misspecification. This framework
allows us to consider agents with a variety of biases, including the level-k models,
confirmation bias, partisan bias, and models where agents over or under-weight the
information contained in their private signals.
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1 Promoting a Reputation for Quality
1.1 Introduction
Firms often have a great deal of influence over the information consumers observe
about its product. A technology company advertises improvements to its phones,
a publisher sends out copies of books to reviewers to make guarantee good reviews,
and a tobacco company suppresses research into the negative effects of smoking. In
this paper, I allow firms to both invest and strategically manage the information
consumers observe about quality. This ability plays a crucial role in the incentive to
build and maintain a reputation. A firm’s ability to promote positive information
about the product is a complement for investment in the quality of the product,
and creates persistent reputation effects. In contrast, a firm’s ability to censor
information is a substitute for investment, and can completely destroy its incentive
to build quality. So while a smartphone manufacturer can recover from a bad
reputation through a combination of effective promotion and high quality products,
a tobacco company that can effectively censor negative information will never be
able to maintain a reputation in the long run.
In the model, a long-lived firm sells a product to short-lived consumers. The
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product’s quality changes at a Poisson rate λ, and is fixed between arrivals, as in
Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013). Quality is not observed by consumers; instead
they observe a Poisson process with an arrival rate that depends on both the quality
of the product and the firm’s choice of information. Whenever an arrival occurs,
consumers observe the quality of the firm’s product. The firm’s reputation is mod-
eled as consumers’ belief about current quality. The firm can promote its product
by increasing the intensity of this news process or censor information by decreas-
ing the intensity of this process. Consumer beliefs about past investment and past
quality play a crucial role in the firm’s current payoff. A consumer is willing to
pay a higher price for a product today if she thinks it was a high quality product
yesterday, so the firm has incentives to both invest in quality and in controlling the
information consumers observe in order to maintain its reputation.
I first consider the good news case, in which a firm selects the arrival rate of news
that the product is high quality. In this case, the firm chooses to generate signals
only when it is producing a high quality product. This creates incentives for the
firm to invest in quality, since the firm knows that it will then be able to promote the
product and sell it at a higher price. The ability to promote can create periods of
time where reputation cycles, but the firm is solely investing in promotion and not in
quality. The ability to control information can also damage incentives and hurt the
firm’s payoffs. Investing in quality and investing in promotion are complements,
in that a firm only benefits from investing in quality if it also promotes. The
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need to promote makes investing more costly, because even if the firm creates a
high quality product, it still has to promote it in order to benefit from the quality
breakthrough. The firm is not only negatively impacted by the cost of promotion,
but is also damaged by lower consumer beliefs. Endogenous promotion decreases a
firm’s incentives to invest in quality, which in turn leads to lower consumer beliefs
and lower payoffs for the firm. Investment in quality is under-incentivized. Even
as investing in quality becomes arbitrarily cheap the firm still shirks when it has a
high reputation.
I focus on Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) taking the firm’s reputation as the
state variable. By focusing on MPEs, I can investigate how the firm’s reputation
creates incentives for investment in quality and information. Every MPE of the
good news game is characterized by three regions. When consumer beliefs are high,
the firm chooses not invest in quality or promotion. At intermediate beliefs, the firm
promotes if it is selling a high quality product but chooses not to invest in quality. In
this intermediate region, the firm invests in promotion to restore its high reputation.
Finally, at low beliefs, the firm promotes when it has a high quality product, and
the firm invests in improving or maintaining quality, independent of the quality of
the product it is currently selling. The firm will never invest in quality unless it also
has incentives to promote, because there is no way for consumers to detect or punish
low levels of investment if they do not expect to see. This equilibrium structure is
distinct from the equilibrium in Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013) and Marinovic,
3
Skrzypacz, and Varas (2015), who consider a similar model. In particular, the
intermediate region where the firm invests in promotion but not in quality does not
exist in either Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013) (who take promotion as exogenous)
or Marinovic, Skrzypacz, and Varas (2015). This region allows the firm to profit
from promotion, which the firm never does in any MPE in Marinovic et al. (2015),
and leads to different long-run belief dynamics than the dynamics in Board and
Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013).
This insight applies to many economic settings. A smartphone manufacturer
initially invests heavily in both the quality of its new phone and in promoting it
when its reputation is very low. Once established, the firm only makes minor im-
provements to newer versions of the phone, yet it still spends a lot on advertising
newer versions. In the good news case, the firm utilizes its ability to control pro-
motion and the quality of its product to create and maintain its reputation. Even
though the firm is only investing in maintaining quality at very low reputations,
the firm’s reputation is still persistent, the firm will constantly invest in renewing
its reputation through promotion and occasional investment in quality.
Next, I consider the bad news case, where bad news about the product arrives at
a fixed rate, and the firm can suppress this information. Censorship and investment
are substitutes. A firm can reduce bad news by either investing in quality or cen-
soring the news. This can cause incentives to disintegrate. The firm is often willing
to forgo investment in quality, because it knows censorship is a viable alternative.
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Oil companies, the food industry, and cigarette manufacturers are prime examples.
Instead of investing in better, safer products, they have invested significantly in
suppressing and undermining research that proves their products are harmful. For
instance, the Sugar Research Foundation paid three scientists $50,000 to down-
play research that showed a connection between heart disease and sugar.1 There is
significant evidence tobacco industry knew as early as 1963 about the hazards of
cigarettes, but hid this research from the public, and suppressed further research.23
Fossil fuel producers like Exxon knew about the harmful effects of fossil fuels over
10 years before it became public knowledge, and they actively worked to hide this
from the public.4
In the bad news case, any MPE can be characterized by two reputation cutoffs.
The firm invests in quality when its reputation is higher than a cutoff and doesn’t
invest otherwise. Similarly, the firm censors bad news when its reputation is suffi-
ciently high, and doesn’t otherwise. When censorship is cheaper than investment,
the firm opts not to invest in quality. Instead, it opts to censor bad news when its
reputation is high. Unless investment in quality is sufficiently less expensive than
censorship, the firm will always substitute censorship for investment in quality, and
therefore will never invest in the quality of its product. In these equilibria, the firm’s
1See http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/13/well/eat/
how-the-sugar-industry-shifted-blame-to-fat.html
2See
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/07/us/tobacco-company-was-silent-on-hazards.html
3See http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/29/us/
scientists-say-cigarette-company-suppressed-findings-on-nicotine.html
4See https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
exxon-knew-about-climate-change-almost-40-years-ago/
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reputation is transient. Consumers have no reason to believe the firm is investing
in its product, and therefore are skeptical of the product. This creates a situation
in which the firm would prefer to commit to never censor, and, in fact, may benefit
when censoring becomes more costly.
Finally, I consider the case of exogenous news. In the good news case, there
is some exogenous rate that good news arrives at, absent promotion, and in the
bad news case, the firm’s ability to censor is imperfect. Bad news can never be
shut down completely. In the good news case, if the cost of investment is high
enough relative to the cost of promotion and the speed of exogeneous news, then
the equilibria have the same structure as in the good news case without exogenous
news. But if the cost of investment is relatively low, then in the long run, the
firm’s reputation dynamics converge to the long run dynamics of the equilibrium in
Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013). In the bad news case, the result that the firm
never invests in quality is robust to the firm being unable to shut down bad news
completely, and to the addition of small amounts of endogenous or exogenous good
news.
Literature Review
This paper builds on the reputation model of Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013),
in which a firm invests in its product’s quality to build a reputation. Quality
shocks arrive at a Poisson rate, and the quality of a product after a shock depends
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on the firm’s current effort. They characterize how a firm builds and maintains
a reputation for selling a high quality product. The firm’s reputation dynamics
depend crucially on the information structure. In the good news case, the firm’s
reputation cycles. After good news arrives, the firm allows both its reputation and
its quality to decay by choosing not to invest and then resumes investment when
reputation is low to build it back up. On the other hand, in the bad news case,
the firm’s reputation is path dependent; the firm’s incentives increase as the firm’s
reputation becomes higher, so if the firm’s reputation ever becomes low enough,
the firm can never recover. Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2015) extend this model
to study a lifecycle model where the firm can choose to when to exit the market.
Halac and Prat (2014) use this framework to study the problem of a manager that
is trying to build a reputation for being attentive.
In related work Marinovic, Skrzypacz, and Varas (2015). They consider a similar
environment, where quality of the product evolves as in Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn
(2013), but the firm can now deterministically reveal its quality at any instant of
time, for a cost. They find that every Markov Perfect Equilibrium has many coun-
terintuitive features. Making it cheaper for the firm to reveal its type always lowers
payoffs, and the firm almost never benefits from a higher reputation. They resolve
this issue by showing that by using time as a state variable, they can significantly
enrich the state space, and support higher payoffs through a more elaborate system
of punishments and rewards. My result illustrates that the counter-intuitiveness
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of the MPE in their paper is a result of their modeling assumptions, and do not
hold when the firm can’t deterministically reveal its type. In contrast, my paper
establishes that the firm can (and will) invest in promotion and not quality at some
reputations, and its ability to promote allows the firm to extend the period it col-
lects reputational dividends. This cannot happen in Markov Perfect Equilibria in
Marinovic et al. (2015).
In addition to Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013), several other papers model
reputation as beliefs over a persistent state, such as product quality, that evolves
endogenously over time. Cisternas (2015) considers a career concerns model where
the worker’s type evolves over time, and the worker can exert effort to try to mimic
higher or lower skilled workers. The worker’s quality is persistent, which gives the
firm persistent incentives to exert effort. Bohren (2012) considers an application
in which a firm’s current quality is partially determined by a persistent, observ-
able state variable that noisily depends on the firm’s past effort choices. One can
view the state as the firm’s reputation, as it informs consumers’ beliefs about the
firm’s current quality. This persistence gives the firm an incentive to invest in qual-
ity. Whether the firm continues to invest in quality at high states depends on the
boundedness of the return to quality.
There is an extensive different, but related, literature that models reputation as
an adverse selection problem, starting with Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson
(1982), and continuing in papers like Fudenberg and Levine (1989) and Cripps,
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Mailath, and Samuelson (2004). These papers model reputation as the consumer’s
belief about the firm’s type, which can either be a strategic type or a behavioral
type. In these papers, players do not care about the firm’s type directly, instead
they care about the strategic behavior that is induced by the possibility of the firm
being a behavioral type. Firms can credibly take actions they wouldn’t take in the
absence of reputation effects in order to influence the inference other players make
about their type. These reputational concerns allow the firm to achieve payoffs that
exceed the payoffs of the game where the consumers know the firm’s type.
There is also a literature on designing an information structure to encourage
reputation building. Dellarocas (2005) considers an environment where a long-lived
seller selling to short-lived buyers has a moral hazard problem, and the designer
designs a signal to help resolve this problem. This persistent signal improves the
seller’s incentives to exert effort, since she will be rewarded in future periods for
high values of the signal, and punished for low values. Hörner and Lambert (2015)
consider a similar problem in a career concerns environment and in addition allow
the designer to choose multiple signals. In these papers, a precise choice of informa-
tion structure can reduce the moral hazard problem. Finally, Pei (2015) considers
how a firm can control the information the market sees about a worker in order
to keep the worker’s outside option low. He finds that the firm’s ability to hide
information about their workers reduces the firm’s ability to induce high levels of
effort.
9
One can view promotion in my paper as a form of advertisement. This is similar
in some ways to the informational story of advertising, explored in a large literature
that dates back to Nelson (1974) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986). These papers
model advertising as a signaling game, where consumers make inference based on the
firm’s expenditure on advertising. Firms with high quality products have lower costs
of advertising, and thus are able to launch more extravagant promotional campaigns.
I explore a different aspect of informational advertising. Consumers do not observe
advertising expenditure directly, or make inferences based on it. Instead, advertising
speeds up how fast consumers learn the quality of the product, which captures
features not only of traditional advertising, but also promotional campaigns like
sending preview copies of books to reviewers, supporting or suppressing research,
and encouraging good reviews. The model considered in this paper does not allow
for the possibility that firm can manipulate the informational content of news. For
instance, in the signaling story a firm with a low quality product can pretend to be
a firm with a high quality product, which cannot happen in this model.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the model. Sec-
tion 1.3 presents the analysis the good news case, including the characterization
of equilibria, and comparisons to the the equilibria in Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn
(2013) and to the equilibria in the game in which the firm can commit to an informa-
tion structure. Section 1.4 presents the analyze the bad news case, and demonstrates
how the ability to censor can lead to a breakdown of the firm’s incentives to invest
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in quality. Finally, section 1.5 considers the addition of exogenous news, and what
impact this has on the structure of equilibria. All proofs are in the appendix.
1.2 Model
The Firm
Time is continuous, t ∈ [0,∞). There is a single long lived firm with stochastic
quality θt ∈ {L,H}. The firm has discount rate r. At each instant of time, the
firm chooses an action, which consists of a level of effort at ∈ [0, 1] and a level of
promotion πt ∈ [0, π̄], for costs cat and kπt, where c > 0, k > 0 and π̄ > 0. The
upper bound on promotion, π̄, is fixed and measures the maximum arrival rate of
news generated by the firm. A firm’s strategy is a stochastic process (at, πt)
∞
t=0
that determines the effort choice and level of promotion at each instant of time
given the history the firm has observed. These strategies are predictable processes
with respect to the σ-algebra generated by the quality Poisson process and the
news Poisson process. Quality evolves via Poisson shocks, as in Board and Meyer-
ter-Vehn (2013). Specifically, there is a Poisson process with intensity λ > 0.
Whenever there is an arrival of this process, θt becomes H with probability at and
L with probability 1− at, and is fixed between arrivals. The firm observes θt.
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Consumers
Consumers do not observe θt, at or πt directly. Consumers observe a Poisson process,
which provides a noisy signal that they use to form beliefs about θt. I consider
two processes, good news and bad news. This news process has intensity πt1θt=H
in the good news case, and intensity (π̄ − πt)1θt=L in the bad news case. Let
xt = Pr(θt = H|F st ), where F st is the σ-algebra generated by the news process,
and the probability measure is the measure induced by the consumers’ beliefs about
the firm’s strategy.
In the good news case, news can only arrive when the firm is selling a high
quality product, and in the bad news case news can only arrive when the firm is
selling a low quality product. When a consumer sees news, she makes a positive
inference in the good news case and a negative inference in the bad news case. The
firm’s choice of π speeds up the arrival rate of good news and slows down the arrival
rate of bad news.
Payoffs
The firm receives a flow payoff of xt. This can be motivated either as the willingness
to pay of consumers with utility 1θt=H or as consumers who are willing to pay 1
arriving at some rate proportional to the public belief. The firm maximizes
max
â,π̂
Eâ,π̂
(∫ ∞
0
e−rt[xt − cât − kπ̂t]dt
)
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where the expectation is taken with respect to the actual probability measure in-
duced by the firm’s chosen effort and promotion levels, while xt is determined by
what consumers believe about the firm’s effort and promotion choices.
Solution Concept
I characterize Markov Perfect Equilibrium. These are equilibria where strategies
only condition on consumers’ beliefs and current quality.
Definition 1. A pure strategy Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) consists of a
markov effort strategy a : [0, 1] × {H,L} → [0, 1], which maps public beliefs to
effort, and a markov promotion strategy π : [0, 1] × {H,L} → [0, π̄] and believed
markov strategies ã and π̃ such that:
1. (a, π) are sequentially rational.
2. Beliefs xt are formed through Bayes Rule given believed strategies (ã, π̃).
5
3. Beliefs are correct, a = ã, π = π̃.
An additional admissibility restriction must be placed on beliefs in order to
ensure the belief process has a unique solution in the MPE. These restrictions are
identical to the restrictions placed in Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013). If beliefs
5While there may be off path actions in some cases considered in this paper, off path beliefs
are completely pinned down by Bayes Rule. If news that is believed to occur with 0 probability
observes, beliefs are restricted to be consistent with the quality revealed by that news and beliefs
subsequently updates through Bayes Rule.
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follow the law of motion ẋt = g(xt), then the drift g(x) must satisfy one of the
following conditions:
1. g(x) = 0
2. g(x) > 0 and g(x) is right continuous at x,
3. g(x) < 0 and g(x) is left continuous at x,
at any cutoff and beliefs can be partitioned into a finite set of intervals such that
both the effort and promotion choices are Lipschitz continuous on the interior of all
these intervals.
These restrictions are placed on consumer’s beliefs about the firm’s strategies,
not on the firm’s strategies themselves. Admissibility ensures that ẋ = g(x) has
a solution and when there are multiple solutions, I select the one consistent with
the discrete time approximation (for details, see Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013)
or Klein and Rady (2011)). As in Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013), this is a
relatively mild assumption that ensures beliefs are defined everywhere and are right
continuous when viewed as a function of t.
Discussion of the Model
There are many ways to interpret the quality process. For instance, arrivals can be
viewed as the firm’s ability to incorporate new discoveries, a firm investing in keeping
a valued employee, or as the firm purchasing a rate of technological improvement
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or abating deterioration of the firm’s technology. While the technology process
is stylized, it satisfies many intuitive properties of persistent quality. Beliefs drift
down when the firm is believed to be shirking and up when the firm is believed to
be working absent any promotion, and the firm’s incentives to exert effort depend
both on present and future quality.
The news process is similarly stylized. The assumption that arrivals of news can
only occur when the firm has a high quality product in the good news case, or when
the firm has a low quality product in the bad news case is a strong assumption.
This can be viewed as a requirement that a successful promotional campaign contain
evidence that the firm’s product is actually good, and that a negative news story
needs evidence that the firm’s product is actually bad. The Poisson structure
captures large jumps in beliefs about quality. For example, an actor winning an
academy award after a production company’s promotional campaign or a news story
about a popular brand of tires exploding causes beliefs to jump significantly. This
process abstracts away from infinitesimal information consumers receive constantly
about a product. For instance, a consumer continuously updating beliefs about
while they are using a product. This information seems more difficult for the firm
to control, although a model with brownian exogenous news may be an interesting
extension.
This information process and π̄, the arrival rate of news, are important objects
in this model and the analysis. π̄ can be viewed as a measure of how difficult it is
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to successfully create an ad campaign (or some other sort of signal) that convinces
consumers that the firm indeed is selling a high quality product or a measure of
how quickly consumers see an ad campaign. This upper bound encapsulates the
difficulty of creating a promotional campaign; how long it takes for the campaign
to permeate the public consciousness; and the difficulty of actually persuading con-
sumers. Therefore, it is in some ways a measure of persuasiveness.
1.3 The Good News Case
In the good news case, the signal process has intensity πt1θt=H . Arrivals can only
occur when the firm has a high quality product, in which case, beliefs jump to 1.
Between arrivals, beliefs follow the law of motion
ẋt = λ(Ãt − xt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quality Breakthroughs
− Π̃txt(1− xt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Absence of signals
,
where Ãt = E(ãt|Ft) is the believed amount the firm is investing in quality and
Π̃t = πt1θt=H is the believed level of promotion.
In between arrivals, the drift of consumer’s beliefs can be expressed as the sum of
two terms. The firm’s effort choice determines the first term (Ãt−xt)λ. Depending
on how much effort the firm is believed to be exerting, this term is either positive
or negative. If consumer’s believe it is more likely that high quality products are
switching to low quality products then low quality products are switching to high
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quality products, then it is negative, otherwise it is positive. The second term,
−π̃txt(1−xt) is determined by the firm’s choice of promotion. This term is negative
if consumers believe the firm is promoting, since it is more likely that no news arrives
if the firm is selling a low quality product, and 0 if the firm is not promoting.
The firm’s value function is
V (x, θ) = max
a,π
E
(∫ ∞
0
e−rt[xt − cat − kπt]dt
∣∣∣∣θ0 = θ, x0 = x) .
This can be rewritten as
V (x0, θ) = max
a,π
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 (r+π(xs,θ)+λ)ds[xt + a(xt, θ)(λ(V (xt, H)− V (xt, L))− c)
+ λV (xt, L) + π(xt, θ)1θ=H(V (1, θ)− k)]dt,
where xt is the solution to ẋt = λ(ãt − xt)− π̃txt(1− xt). As in Board and Meyer-
ter-Vehn (2013), this can be rewritten as
V (xt, θ) = max
a,π
∫ ∞
0
xt + a(xt, θ)(λD(xt)− c) + π(xt, θ)(∆(xt)− k)
+ λV (xt, L)− λV (xt, θ)− rV (xt, θ)dt,
where D(x) = V (x,H)− V (x, L) and ∆(x) = V (1, H)− V (x,H). This implies the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. (Sequential Rationality) (a, π) are a MPE if and only if a(x, ω)
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solves
max
a∈[0,1]
λD(x)a− ca,
π(x,H) solves
max
π∈[0,π̄]
∆(x)π − kπ,
and π(xt, L) = 0 for all x.
The firm’s incentive to exert effort is driven by D(x), the change in the firm’s
expected payoffs if a quality change arrives at that instant. The firm’s incentive to
promote is driven by ∆(x); the change in payoffs if a beliefs jumped at that instant.
An important feature of this model is that the effort choice is independent of the
firm’s type, which greatly simplifies the analysis.
D(x) and ∆(x) have a tight relationship, because the increase in a firms payoff
from having high quality is due to the potential reputational benefits the firm re-
ceives in the future once it is selling a high quality product. This is captured in the
following proposition.
Lemma 2. The difference in expected payoffs between a firm selling a high quality
product and a firm selling a low quality product can be written as
D(x0) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+λ)tπ(xt, H)[∆(xt)− k]dt.
Moreover, payoffs satisfy the following properties for any beliefs
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1. V (·, H) and V (·, L) are strictly increasing.
2. V (xt, H) ≥ V (xt, L) for all xt.
3. ∆(x) is decreasing.
4. D(x) is decreasing.
The value functions are increasing. Given any two initial conditions x0 and x
∗
0,
if x0 > x
∗
0 then xt > x
∗
t until the first arrival. The firm can then mimic the ∗-firm
and induce the same probability measure over θt and arrivals at all points, while
receiving a strictly higher flow payoff. Therefore, the its payoff must be higher.
Similarly, V (xt, H) ≥ V (xt, L) because a high quality firm can play the exact same
strategy as the low quality firm to guarantee themselves the same payoff. This
directly implies that ∆(x) is decreasing, and this, combined with the optimality of
π and the previous observation about xt and x
∗
t , implies that D(x) is decreasing.
The previous lemmas imply that optimal strategies are cutoff strategies. The
firm shirks and doesn’t promote at high beliefs and as beliefs drift down eventually
starts promoting and working. This greatly simplifies the existence argument and
implies that in any equilibrium beliefs can be categorized into four different regions;
the region where the firm is promoting or working, the region where the firm is
promoting but not working, the region where the firm is working but not promoting
and the region where the firm is working and promoting. The following proposition
establishes the unique structure of any Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
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Proposition 1. Every Markov Equilibrium is characterized by two cutoffs x∗, x∗∗ ∈
[0, 1), such that x∗ ≤ x∗∗. Optimal strategies satisfy
a(x) =

1 if x < x∗
0 if x > x∗
,
π(x,H) =

π̄ if x < x∗∗
0 if x > x∗∗
,
and π(x, L) = 0. When π̄ ≤ λ
• x∗ < x∗∗ in any MPE where x∗∗ > 0.
• a MPE exists.
As beliefs decrease, the firm always begins promoting before it starts working.
If there were a region where consumers believed the firm was working and not
promoting, their beliefs would drift up, so it would never have any incentive to
promote once beliefs were high enough. But if this was the case, then the firm
would have no incentive to work, since the information consumers expect to see
wouldn’t change if the firm shirked. Therefore the firm must start promoting before
it starts working. This can lead to long cycles where the firm builds and maintains
reputation through promotion without exerting effort. After a quality breakthrough
and a successful promotion, the firm collects reputational dividends and tries to use
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its ability to promote to extend the period of time when it collects these dividends
without investing in quality.
Figure 1.1: Structure of a MPE
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Figure 1.2: Belief Dynamics between arrivals
Markov Perfect Equilibria always exist if λ ≥ π̄. From a technical perspective,
this assumption implies that beliefs are drifting up when the firm is investing and
down when the firm isn’t, which implies that at x∗ the drift is always 0 at any
equilibrium. This assumption means that the quality of the firm’s product changes
faster than the firm can signal that it has a high quality product. This is a nat-
ural assumption for a variety of applications. For instance, an athlete’s ability is
relatively responsive to how much effort they exerted at practice that season, while
our beliefs about his or her quality change relatively infrequently. Tech firms are
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constantly innovating, changing both hardware and software for a new phone, while
our beliefs that the next phone is going to be good or bad seem to change relatively
slowly. When a firm stops investing in its star employees, they leave and find new
employment much faster than the firm can credibly produce a evidence of high
quality, in particular in fields where the market for star employees is particularly
competitive.
The result that the firm never exerts effort before it starts promoting is also
present in Marinovic et al. (2015). But, unlike in Marinovic et al. (2015), this is
not always bad for the firm, since beliefs no longer jump to 0 as soon as consumers
believe the firm would be promoting but don’t see any news. In Marinovic et al.
(2015), promotion never has any value to the firm in equilibrium. The best possible
case is that the marginal benefit from promotion is equal to its cost. As opposed
to the MPEs in Marinovic et al. (2015), in this paper the firm exerts effort when
beliefs are non-zero and benefits from consumers giving them the benefit of the
doubt when they don’t see any news.
I consider two different types of commitment to investigate how endogenous
promotion changes firm payoffs. I first examine how the game with endogenous
promotion compares to the game with exogenous promotion from Board and Meyer-
ter-Vehn (2013). In this game, the firm pays a lump sum at the beginning of the
game in order to commit to promoting whenever it has a high quality product for
no flow cost.6 I then consider what strategy promotion strategy the firm would
6If promotion still has a flow cost, the firm may never want to invest in quality because it
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like commit in the game with endogenous promotion. Since the firm’s promotion
strategy was not observable by consumers, the firm is unable to fully internalize
the impact its choice of promotion has on the drift of beliefs and on the level
of investment. By allowing the firm to commit to a promotion strategy, I can
investigate whether the firm is over or under-investing in promotion.
The ability to promote creates a moral hazard problem. The firm needs to
be promoting before it has any incentive to invest in its product. Consider the
alternative game from Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013), where the firm cannot
control the news process. Instead consumers learn by observing an exogenous news
process with arrival rate π̄1θt=H .
Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013) show that in the game with exogenous pro-
motion, all MPEs have the following form
a(x, θ) =

1 if x < x∗BM
0 if x > x∗BM
for some cutoff x∗BM ∈ [0, 1]. Comparing this cutoff to the cutoff in when the firm
can endogenously promote allows me to look at how the ability to endogenously
choose the level of promotion changes how reputational concerns incentivize the
firm to invest in quality.
Proposition 2. If λ ≥ π̄ then the equilibrium of the game with exogenous promotion
doesn’t want to pay for promotion.
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is unique and x∗BM ≥ x∗ (and is strict as long as x∗BM ̸= 0). Let X be the stationary
distribution, supp(XBM) ⊆ supp(X ).
The firm’s incentives to invest in quality are reduced when compared to the
game studied in Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013). While the firm still eventually
invests in quality, it starts investing at lower reputations, so the incentive to exert
effort to avoid a bad reputation is diminished. The ability to choose when to
promote decreases the gap between the payoffs received by a firm selling a high
quality product and a firm selling a low quality product, so the firm chooses to
start working at a lower belief. This does not necessarily imply the firm is always
investing less in quality, because beliefs move in a fundamentally different way in the
two models. While the firm with exogenous promotion starts working at a higher
belief, it expect beliefs to jump to 1 more, since arrivals can occur anywhere, and
these arrivals delay when it has to begin investing in effort. On the other hand,
when the firm has a low quality product, it will begin investing sooner in the game
with exogenous promotion than in the game with endogenous promotion, because
no news can arrive to delay investment.
The firm receives some benefit from exogenous promotion. For instance, a firm
selling a low quality product when beliefs are close to 1 receives higher flow payoffs
for longer because consumers’ no longer make inferences from not seeing any news,
but there also is a cost. After news arrives, consumer beliefs can drop to a lower
point than it would in the game with exogenous promotion, which can lower the
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firm’s payoffs. This suggests that a firm may benefit from committing to exogenous
promotion by hiring an outside advertising agency, in order to incentivize effort at
higher beliefs.
When promotion is exogenous, consumers learn that that the firm is selling a
high quality product more frequently.
Corollary 1. Let x0 = 1, and λ ≥ π̄. Let τ = inf{t > 0 : xt = 1}, and τBM =
inf{t > 0 : xBM,t = 1}. Then E(τ) > E(τBM).
The expected time it takes for reputation to return to 1 is smaller when the firm
has committed to exogenous promotion. Reputation cycles more frequently when
the firm has committed to promote. The increased incentive to invest leads to a
higher shirk-work cutoff x∗, which in turn leads to consumers learning that the firm
is selling a high quality product more frequently.
This suggests that the firm may benefit overall from committing to promote
whenever it has a high quality product, independent of its reputation. If the firm
could pay an advertising agency a lump sum in exchange for the ad agency commit-
ting to promote, they would benefit from the enhanced incentives for investment
in quality. This is explored more in the following section, in the limiting case as
c→ 0.
In equilibrium, the firm is not fully internalizing the impact of its choice on
promotion on the law of motion for beliefs and on its choice of investment. To
explore this effect more, suppose the firm could commit to any cutoff x∗∗FB ex-ante.
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With this commitment power, the firm internalizes its ability to control the drift of
beliefs, and how its choice determines what investment strategies are credible.
Proposition 3. Suppose λ ≥ π̄. If the firm could commit to promoting below any
cutoff, it would commit to promoting at a cutoff x∗∗c ≤ x∗∗ for any x∗∗ that is a
promotion cutoff in a MPE of the original game.
Given an equilibrium, with cutoffs x∗, x∗∗, in the game where the firm has com-
mitted to the optimal promotion strategy, it chooses to invest in quality at a higher
reputation, x∗c ≥ x∗ for any x∗ that is a investment cutoff in the MPE of the original
game if θ0 = H and x0 ∈ [0, 1] \ [x∗, x∗∗).
If θ0 = L, there exists some x̄ > 0 such that if x0 ≤ x̄ the previous result holds.
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Figure 1.3: Optimal level of investment and promotion with and without commit-
ment.
The firm commits to a higher level of promotion because it now internalizes
the impact its promotion has on the drift of beliefs. This in turn, can increase
the incentives to invest, by raising the payoff from a high reputation. The firm is
under-investing in quality and over-investing in promotion. The firm would like to
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be promoting less, in order to prevent consumers from interpreting lack of news as
a bad sign, but without commitment power, it cannot convince consumers that it
wouldn’t promote at a higher reputation.
In order to capture how the firm’s ability to promote impacts incentives, it
is interesting to consider the limiting case as c → 0. This simplifies the firm’s
effort choice, and allows me to focus on the firm’s promotion decision and how that
decision impacts payoffs. In addition, while there may be multiple equilibria in
this model, these equilibria all converge to the same limiting equilibrium as c→ 0,
which allows me to characterize some comparative statics.
Proposition 4. As c→ 0, if λ ≥ π̄,
1. |x∗ − x∗∗| → 0
2. There is a unique point x̄∗∗ such that for any sequence of costs (cn)
∞
n=1 and
a corresponding sequence of equilibria, characterized by cutoffs (x∗n, x
∗∗
n )
∞
n=1,
x∗∗n → x̄∗∗. moreover x̄∗∗ < 1.
3. In the limiting equilibrium, as k decreases payoffs increase.
Unlike in Marinovic et al. (2015), decreasing k doesn’t always decrease firm
payoffs. When costs are sufficiently low, the firm benefits from cheaper promo-
tion, because it increases the firm’s incentives to work. The gap between the work
cutoff and the promotion cutoff vanishes, but the firm still only works after it has
begun promoting, even when costs are arbitrarily low, since the firm can never cred-
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ibly work unless consumers expect it to also promote when it has a high quality
product. Even as investment becomes arbitrarily cheap, the firm still doesn’t work
everywhere. The firm still has to pay for promotion to make effort worthwhile,
which indirectly makes effort costly.
Reputation cycles persist, even as investment becomes arbitrarily inexpensive.
The firm’s reputation drifts down until hitting x∗, and the firm then invests in
building it back up. Even a very established firm has to invest in promoting its
product.
In this limit, I can compare the payoffs from the game with exogenous promotion
to the game with endogenous promotion.
Proposition 5. As c→ 0, if λ ≥ π̄, VBM(x, θ) > V (x, θ)+E
(∫∞
0
e−rtkπt|x0 = x, θ0 = θ
)
,
where VBM is the value function from the game where news arrives at exogenous
rate π̄1θt=H .
So the firm would be willing to pay more than its total expected expenditure on
promotion in order to commit to promoting at rate π̄ whenever it has a high quality
product. In this limit, the firm is hurt by the ability to control promotion because it
leads to worse consumer beliefs. The firm benefits from hiring an advertising agency,
even if the agency doesn’t have any sort of comparative advantage or superior
technology. The firm benefits simply because the ad agency can be used as a
commitment device, convincing consumers that the firm will promote whenever it
has a high quality product.
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The ability to promote also can lower the firm’s payoffs by causing beliefs to
drift down faster. If the firm could commit to never promote, beliefs would always
follow the law of motion ẋt = λ(ãt − xt) instead of drifting down at rate ẋt =
λ(ãt−xt)− π̃t(xt)(1−xt), but the firm also loses the ability to benefit from investing
in quality, since consumers no longer see any news. In the limit, as c → 0, I can
characterize which of these effects is larger.
Corollary 2. As c → 0, if λ ≥ π̄, payoffs in the limiting equilibrium are greater
than payoffs in the equilibrium where the firm has committed to never promote.
The firm still does benefit from promotion, even though it makes effort costly.
Since promotion allows consumers to distinguish between high and low quality firms,
it gives firms the ability to build a reputation. Without this promotion technology,
the firm would have no incentive to work because shirking would be undetectable.
These results contrast with Marinovic et al. (2015) where in any Markov Perfect
Equilibria, payoffs are decreasing as k decreases and the firm would rather commit
to not promoting in any MPE. The deterministic nature of the firm’s signaling
technology in Marinovic et al. (2015) model forces the firm to signal so frequently
that the firm no longer benefits at all from building a reputation.
1.4 The Bad News Case
In this section I consider the case in which consumers learn= about the firm’s
quality through arrivals of bad news, and the firm tries to censor this bad news.
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Unlike promotion, censorship is a substitute for effort and can cause incentives to
completely break down.
The difference between the good news and bad news model is the news process.
Now the news process has arrival rate max(0, π̄1θt=L−πt) and πt ∈ [0, π̄]. Consumer
beliefs now follow the law of motion
ẋt = λ(Ãt − xt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quality breakthroughs
+(π̄ − Π̃t)xt(1− xt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Absence of news
.
Unlike in the good news case, the signaling term now causes beliefs to drift up. If
consumers believe the firm is not censoring, not seeing any news is more likely to
occur when the firm is selling a high quality product. When news arrives, consumers
learn that θt = L and adjust their beliefs to 0.
Incentives to work and censor are now driven by the firm’s fear of consumers
figuring out that it is selling a low quality product. As before, the firm’s value
function can be written as
V (x, θ) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(
∫ t
0 r+λ+π̄−πsds)[xs + π̄1θt=L(V (0, L)− V (xt, L))
+ πt(V (xt, L)− V (0, L)− k))
+ at(λ(V (xt, H)− V (xt, L))− c)
+ λ(V (xt, L)− V (xt, θ))− rV (xt, θ)]dt.
The firm’s incentives to invest in effort and promotion are similar to before. The
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incentive to invest is still driven by D(x), but now the incentive to promote is driven
by ∆(x) = V (xt, L)− V (0, L).
Lemma 3. (Sequential Rationality) The optimal a(xt, θ) solves
max
a∈[0,1]
λD(xt)a− ca
and the optimal π(xt, L) solves
max
π∈[0,π̄]
∆(xt)π − kπ.
This leads to very different effort choices than the good news case. Now the
firm has incentives to invest when beliefs are high, because it is worried about
consumers finding out that it has a low quality product. Like before, D(x) and
∆(x) are related.
Lemma 4. The difference in expected payoffs between a firm selling a high quality
product and a firm selling a low quality product can be written as
D(x0) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+λ)t[(π̄ − π(xt, L))(∆(xt))− kπ(xt, L)]dt.
Moreover, payoffs satisfy the following properties for any beliefs
1. V (·, H) and V (·, L) are strictly increasing.
2. V (xt, H) ≥ V (xt, L) for all xt.
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3. ∆(x) is increasing.
4. D(x) is increasing.
D(x) is increasing in x by similar logic as the good news case. ∆(xt) is clearly
increasing in x, and πt maximizes pointwise ∆(xt)πt − kπt. This is equivalent to
minimizing (π̄ − πt)∆(xt) + kπt. Since ∆(xt) is strictly increasing in x, so the
minimum value of this is increasing in x. Moreover, as before, beliefs that start
out higher always stay higher, so for any x > x′, the integrand is always greater
for xt than for x
′
t, so D(x) > D(x
′). This means, as before, equilibrium can be
characterized in terms of cutoffs x∗ and x∗∗.
Proposition 6. A MPE exists. Moreover, in any MPE, there exist cutoffs x∗ ∈
[0, 1] and x∗∗ ∈ (0, 1] such that equilibrium strategies take the form
a(x, θ) =

1 if x > x∗
0 if x < x∗
,
for θ ∈ {L,H},
π(x, L) =

π̄ if x > x∗∗
0 if x < x∗∗
,
and π(x,H) = 0.
Consider any equilibrium where x∗ and x∗∗ are less than 1. Then there is a
region near 1 where beliefs are drifting up, the bad quality firm is censoring and
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working, and the firm never leaves this region. So in this region D(xt) =
kπ̄
r+λ
, the
difference in the payoff for the high and low quality firms comes purely from the low
quality firm having to pay the additional cost of censorship. This naturally implies
the following stark result
Proposition 7. When (1 + r
λ
)c > kπ̄, there is a unique MPE.7 In that MPE the
firm never invests in quality.
Figure 1.4: The structure of a full shirk equilibrium
The firm’s ability to censor gives it quite a bit of control over how much it loses
from quality switching from high to low. Since the firm can always censor bad
news after quality switches, it never loses more than kπ̄ at each instant of time
from being a low quality firm. Therefore it would never exert effort when kπ̄ is low
enough relative to the cost of effort. If censoring bad news is too easy (for instance,
cheaper than exerting effort), then the firm would always choose to substitute effort
for censorship.
7In this proposition and the subsequent proposition, uniqueness is taken to mean that all
equilibria induce the same payoffs, distribution over beliefs and strategies are the same (except
on a set of measure 0) except when the firm is indifferent between censoring and not. Since for
some parameter values, beliefs may drift down to a point where the firm is indifferent, and then
stay there until news arrives, the firm can play any strategy at these points as long as it induces
the same drift of beliefs at these points.
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The intuition that leads to the firm never investing in quality holds for more
general classes of equilibria than Markov Perfect. The argument that the firm never
invests in quality straightforwardly generalizes to any equilibrium that uses calender
time in addition to belief and firm type as the state variables, and in fact it holds
for the class of all almost perfect bayesian equilibria.
Proposition 8. If (1+ r
λ
)c > kπ̄, the MPE from proposition 7 is the unique perfect
bayesian equilibrium.
This contrasts dramatically from the result in Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013),
who find that without the ability to censor bad news, there are equilibrium where
the firm works. In fact, when λ ≥ π̄ and λπ̄
(r+λ)(r+π̄)
> c, there are constants a < b
such that all x∗ ∈ [a, b] are is a cutoff of an equilbria where the firm works above
x∗ if the firm was unable to censor. But giving the firm the ability to censor for a
low enough cost completely destroys the firm’s incentives to invest.
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Time
B
el
ie
fs
Belief Trajectory in a Full Shirk Equilibrium
 
 
Beliefs
x**
Shirk
Censor
Shirk
Don’t Censor
Figure 1.5: An example of the trajectory beliefs follow until news arrives in a full
shirk equilibrium.
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This full shirk equilibrium has many undesirable properties from the firm’s per-
spective. While an equilibrium where the firm is working can have persistent repu-
tation building, with probability 1 in a full shirk equilibrium the firm’s reputation
vanishes in finite time. A firm that could commit to not censoring would not suffer
from these sorts of incentive problems. Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013) identify
the possibility of equilibria where the firm works when the bad news technology
is exogeneous, but introducing sufficiently cheap censorship technology completely
destroys these incentives.
Corollary 3. Suppose (1 + r
λ
)c > kπ̄. Let (rn)
∞
n=0 be a sequence of discount rates
such that rn → 0. Consider a sequence of equilibrium with discount rate rn, and
a sequence of equilibria of the game where the firm has committed to not censor.
Then:
1. limn→∞ rn
(
Vn(x, θ) + E
(∫
e−rntkπtdt|x0 = x, θ0 = θ
))
≤ lim inf rnVc,n(x, θ).
2. This inequality is strict for any x > min(1− λ
π̄
, lim sup x∗c,n)
8
The firm’s willingness to pay for not censoring is always higher than the amount
the firm expects to spend on censorship in the game with endogenous censorship
as the firm becomes patient whenever the firm’s reputation starts high enough. As
the firm becomes patient, all that matters is where beliefs end up. In the game
with censorship, 0 is the unique absorbing state, beliefs always eventually converge
8A sufficient condition for x > lim supx∗c,n is if
∫∞
0
e−λtπ̄
∫∞
t
e−π̄sxs ds dt ≥ cλ , where x0 = x
and ẋt = −λxt + π̄xt(1− xt).
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to 0. On the other hand, in the game where the firm has committed, in any region
where beliefs are drifting up, with positive probability the firm eventually starts
selling a high quality product, never stops, and beliefs drift up towards 1. So the
firm receives a positive payoff with positive probability forever.
When kπ̄ >
(
1 + r
λ
)
c, there may exist equilibria where the firm invests in quality.
The firm now finds investing desirable because once it has a high quality product,
it has either shut down bad news or no longer needs to censor bad news. There
always exist equilibria of the form illustrated in the following figure.
Figure 1.6: The structure of an equilibrium where the firm stops censoring before
it stops working.
In this equilibrium, the firm works and censors when it has a high reputation,
stops censoring at an intermediate reputation and stops working when its reputation
is low enough. In equilibria of this type, as long as x∗ > 0, beliefs can converge
to 0 or 1. At 1, the firm has the incentive to invest because if the firm chooses
not to invest and its product becomes a low quality product, it will then have to
censor news to maintain its high reputation. But, since censoring is sufficiently
expensive, the firm always has the incentive to invest in quality in order to not
have to censor bad news. At 0, if x∗ > 0, the firm can never convince consumers
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that it is investing in quality, so it never benefits from investing in quality, and its
reputation can never recover. For very low c, the firm can have the incentive to
work everywhere, in which case beliefs converge to 1 with probability 1.
In this equilibrium, beliefs depend crucially on the both the initial condition
and are path dependent. In the region where the firm is censoring and investing,
beliefs converge to 1 with probability 1. If beliefs start in the region near 0 where
beliefs are drifting down, beliefs converge to 0 with probability 1. In every other
region, with positive probability beliefs converge to either 1 or 0.
While the game without censorship from Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013) has
similar qualitative features, now a low quality firm with a high reputation can
benefit from the ability to censor. The low quality firm can’t be caught selling a low
quality product if it’s censoring, so it is better able to maintain a high reputation.
On the other hand, a firm with a high quality product and a high reputation is only
hurt by the ability to censor. Since the firm always has the incentive to invest in
quality in the region where it has chosen to censor, a firm that starts with a high
quality product never actually censors any bad news. On the other hand, the firm
faces beliefs that drift up more slowly than they would if the firm could convince
consumers that it was working and never censoring.
Equilibrium could also have the structure illustrated in the following figure.
Equilibria with this structure may not always exist, but there are parameter values
where equilibria of this form do exist. In this class of equilibria the limiting dis-
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Figure 1.7: The structure of an equilibrium where the firm stops working before it
stops censoring.
tribution of beliefs is entirely determined by the initial belief. Unless beliefs start
in the region where the firm invests and censors, beliefs go to 0 with probability 1,
and otherwise beliefs go to 1 with probability 1. As in the previous case, the ability
to censor allows a low quality firm with a high reputation to preserve its reputation
until it successfully develops a better product. On the other hand, it now allows a
low quality firm with an intermediate reputation that never plans on investing in
quality to prevent its reputation from dropping to 0 until it is already very low.
1.5 Exogenous News
In this section I consider the case of exogenous news. In the good news case, exoge-
nous news means that good news can arrive even when the firm is not promoting,
and in the bad news case, the firm can no longer perfectly censor negative informa-
tion.
In the good news case, news now arrives at rate (µ + πt)1θt=H . Even when the
firm is not promoting, good news still can arrive if the firm is selling a high quality
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product. In this case, beliefs follow the law of motion
ẋt = λ(Ãt − xt)− (Π̃t + µt)xt(1− xt).
Even if the firm is not promoting, consumers still expect to see news and make
inference based on that. As in the good news case with only endogenous news, the
MPE can be expressed in terms of cutoffs.
Proposition 9. Every Markov Perfect Equilibrium is characterized by two cutoffs
x∗ ∈ [0, 1), x∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) where
a(x) =

1 if x < x∗
0 if x > x∗
,
π(x,H) =

π̄ if x < x∗∗
0 if x > x∗∗
,
and π(x, L) = 0.
1. If λ ≥ µ, and
(
1 + r
λ
)
c ≥ kµ then x∗∗ ≥ x∗.
2. If λ ≥ µ, and
(
1 + r
λ
)
c < kµ, then x∗ > x∗∗ or x∗ = x∗∗ = 0.9
9As before, existence is a bit of an issue here. If λ ≥ µ+ π̄, existence can be established
using the argument from proposition 1 In the 2nd case, existence can be established whenever
λ ≥ µ. x∗ must be exactly the cutoff from an equilibrium in Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013),
and taking this cutoff fixed, a unique x∗∗ can be pinned down.
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Without exogenous news the promotion cutoff was always above the investment
cutoff, x∗∗ ≥ x∗, because if the firm was believed to be working but not promoting
then consumers would have no way of detecting deviations. With exogenous news,
this logic no longer holds. But the value of investing in quality is still determined by
how much the firm expects to benefit from consumers finding out that it is selling
a high quality product,
D(x) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+λ)t[µ∆(xt) + π(xt, H)(∆(xt)− k) dt.
If the cost of investment is high, as in the first case, then ∆(x∗) needs to be relatively
high to provide incentives to invest, which implies the firm also has incentive to
promote.
In the first case, the firm’s strategies have the same structure as they had in the
perfect good news case. If promotion is sufficiently cheap, investment is sufficiently
expensive or exogenous news is sufficiently inexpensive, the equilibrium structure
remains the same. At a high reputation, the firm doesn’t invest in quality or promote
its product, at intermediate reputations the firm promotes high quality products,
but does not invest, and at low reputations the firm invests and promotes.
In the long run, in these equilibria, the firm still uses promotion to manage
its reputation. Investment is sufficiently expensive and exogenous news arrives
sufficiently slowly that the firm wants to promote in order to try to delay when it
has to start investing in quality. This is not the case when the cost of investment is
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sufficiently cheap or exogenous news is sufficiently effective , as in the second case.
Figure 1.8: MPE in the second case.
In the second case, the firm finds it optimal to start investing in quality at a
higher reputation than they start investing in promotion in order to take advantage
of this exogenous news. Since λ ≥ µ, beliefs drift up when the firm is investing in
quality and not promoting since quality shocks arrive faster than exogenous news.
In turn, this means that start above the promotion cutoff will never drift below it,
as illustrated in the figure.
Corollary 4. Suppose λ ≥ µ, and
(
1 + r
λ
)
c < kµ. Let τ0 be the first time good
news arrives. For any t > τ0, πt = 0.
Once a firm has established a high reputation, exogenous news is effective enough
to credibly support investment in the absence of promotion. When the firm’s repu-
tation starts off sufficiently low, they promote until their reputation becomes suffi-
ciently high, and then stop promoting. This is reminiscent of expensive restaurants,
which may initially advertise or hold lavish grand openings, but eventually no longer
need to spend effort on promotion because word of mouth and good reviews ensure
that their reputation stays high. These established restaurants know that when
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they serve a great meal, people are going to find out, even if they don’t do anything
to advertise that fact.
Unsurprisingly, the bad news results are less clear. Consider a model where the
firm can censor, but can’t censor perfectly. In particular, bad news arrives at rate
µ > π̄. Even without exogenous news, the equilibrium structure is ambiguous, there
may be both equilibria where the firm stops censoring at a higher reputation than
they stop working and equilibria where the reverse happens. It seems unlikely that
adding exogenous news would clarify this ambiguity. I can check the robustness of
the result that the firm never invests.
Proposition 10. For any ε > 0, µ− π̄ < ε and kπ̄ ≤ (1 + r/λ)c− ε, then there is
a unique MPE in which the firm never invests in quality.
The bad news results are robust to imperfect censorship, as long as the rate
of bad news that cannot be censored is sufficiently small. If the firm can almost
perfectly censor, then the firm still has very tight control over how much they benefit
from having a high quality product relative to a low quality product. Censorship
must be very expensive in order to for the firm to have incentives to credibly invest.
Analogous results holds, if there is a small probability of exogenous good news, or
if the firm can promote but can only induce a very low maximal arrival rate of good
news. For space, I’ve omitted these results, but I’m happy to provide them upon
request.
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1.6 Conclusion
A firm’s ability to control what information consumers see about a product is a
crucial part of a firm’s ability to build and maintain a reputation. Even as effort
becomes arbitrarily cheap, a firm will still spend some time not working, because it
knows there is no benefit from investment in quality unless it invests in promotion.
Censoring bad news can have much starker effects on incentives. While promo-
tion and effort are complements, I exert effort because I know I can promote my
successes in the future, effort and censorship are substitutes. This leads to cases
where, when the cost of censorship is sufficiently lower, the firm never invests in its
product, instead choosing to invest in hiding bad news about the product.
This is reminiscent of oil companies suppressing research about climate change
or cigarette companies suppressing research about how unhealthy cigarettes are.
While these companies could be investing in products that are safer and more ef-
fective, instead they’ve invested significant amounts of money in hiding bad news
about their products. This has not only been bad for consumers, but seems to have
also been bad for the companies, which are now trying to escape their negative rep-
utations. Elaborate re-branding campaigns by Phillip Morris or British Petroleum
seem to be designed entirely to escape the firm’s reputation for selling dangerous,
harmful products.
On the other hand, these properties may not extend to arbitrary public perfect
equilibria that are not markovian in the public belief. As in Marinovic et al. (2015)
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and Halac and Prat (2014), there may be equilibria in richer state spaces that have
different properties and rely on more complicated cycles of rewards and punishments
through consumer’s public beliefs. Equilibria that are markovian in the public belief
capture features of how firm incentives for investment and signaling are driven by
reputation concerns, but there certainly may be a larger class of equilibria that also
have interesting features.
Controlling information is an important component of how a firm builds and
maintains its reputation. The ability to promote and the ability to censor lead to
interesting equilibrium dynamics and has real consequences on both firm strategies
and firm payoffs. There are many other environments where a similar analysis
may be worth investigating. For instance, it may be interesting to investigate how
firm’s can compete through the release of information. There are also many other
ways a firm could control information; for instance, by hiding some of the history
or choosing which summary statistics to display to consumers that may also be
worthwhile to investigate.
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2 Bounded Rationality and Learning: a Frame-
work and a Robustness Result
Joint with J. Aislinn Bohren
2.1 Introduction
When faced with a new decision, individuals gather information from many diverse
sources before choosing an action. They observe the prior choices of peers, the
announcements of public institutions such as a government or health organization,
as well as information from private sources. For example, when deciding whether
to enroll in a credential program, an individual may read pamphlets and statistics
about the opportunities the program provides, discuss the merits of the program
with faculty members and observe the enrollment choices of other students. In order
to learn, these individuals must have a model of how to interpret private and public
signals, how the choices of other individuals reflect their information, and how to
aggregate information from these multiple sources.
A rich literature in psychology and experimental economics documents the myr-
iad biases that individuals exhibit when processing information from a direct source
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or learning from the actions of others. Individuals have been found to systemat-
ically overweight information in favor of their prior beliefs (confirmation bias),10
overreact or underreact to information,incorrectly aggregate correlated information
(correlation neglect)11 and misunderstand how others draw inference.12 These bi-
ases are forms of model misspecification in which individuals have incorrect models
of the informational environment and the way others make decisions.
In this paper, we explore model misspecification in a sequential learning frame-
work. Individuals face a choice between two alternatives and the payoff from se-
lecting an alternative depends on an unknown state of the world. Prior to making
a decision, an individual learns about the state by observing the actions of her pre-
decessors, a private signal and a sequence of public signals. An individual’s type
specifies how she interprets private and public signals and how she believes oth-
ers draw inference. Individuals with different types may coexist, and can either be
aware or unaware of each others’ models of the world – depending on the model of in-
ference associated with each type. This framework captures information-processing
biases such as confirmation bias, partisan bias, underweighting or overweighting
information and correlation neglect, as well as behavioral models of inference such
as level-k and cognitive hierarchy.
We seek to characterize the asymptotic behavior and beliefs of individuals. We
10Lord et al. (1979); Darley and Gross (1983); Plous (1991).
11Kallir and Sonsino (2009); Eyster and Weizsacker (2011); Enke and Zimmermann (2017).
12Kübler and Weizsäcker (2004); Kübler and Weizscker (2005); Penczynski (forthcoming);
Grebe et al. (2008).
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know from correctly specified observational learning models that individuals asymp-
totically adopt the desirable action when there are arbitrarily precise private signals
(Smith and Sorensen, 2000), actions that perfectly reveal beliefs (Lee, 1993), a sub-
set of individuals who do not observe others’ actions (Acemoglu et al., 2011) or an
infinite sequence of public signals.13 Our goal is to determine whether individuals
with misspecified models continue to adopt the desirable action, whether individ-
uals with different misspecified models conform or disagree, and how this depends
on the type of misspecification.
Our first main result (Theorem 1) characterizes asymptotic learning outcomes
– the long-run beliefs about the state. Misspecification opens the door to learning
outcomes that do not occur in the correctly specified model, including incorrect
learning, where beliefs converge to the wrong state with positive probability, non-
stationary incomplete learning, where beliefs about the state almost surely do not
converge, and disagreement, where with positive probability, some types learn the
correct state and others learn the incorrect state. We characterize which of these
learning outcomes arise under different forms of misspecification, and show that
each of outcome is possible under certain types of misspecification.
Our second main results (Theorems 2 and 3) establish that the correctly specified
model is robust to misspecification. As long as individuals have approximately
correct models of the signal processes and how others draw inference, then learning
13Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992) first studied the sequential observational
learning framework with a binary signal space. They demonstrated that when the action space is
coarser than the signal space, it is possible for learning to be incomplete.
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is complete in that asymptotically, individuals almost surely learn the true state.
This result holds for any type of bias in interpreting private information, public
information, others’ actions, or a combination thereof. It also applies to settings
in which there are multiple types of individuals with biases that move in different
directions, provided that none of these biases are too severe.
We close with three applications that demonstrate various features of the results
– level-k reasoning, partisan bias and confirmation bias. In the level-k application,
individuals correctly interpret signals but have a misspecified model of how others
draw inference. Depending on the severity of the misspecification, individuals may
learn the correct or incorrect state, and two different levels may asymptotically
disagree. In the partisan bias example, some individuals systematically weight
information towards one of the states. Similarly, we establish when correct and
incorrect learning arise in this setting.
Related Literature. Other theoretical work examines the implications of in-
formation processing biases for asymptotic learning. Epstein et al. (2010) study
asymptotic learning when individuals underweight and overweight new information
and show that overweighting new information can lead to incorrect learning. Got-
tlieb (2015) shows that allowing individuals to selectively interpret signals leads to
confirmation bias and conservatism bias. Schwartzstein (2014) shows that selective
attention leads to biased forecasts. Wilson (2014) shows that bounded memory can
lead to behavior that is consistent with many documented behavioral phenomena,
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including belief polarization, confirmation bias and salience. Rabin and Schrag
(1999) outline a framework for modeling confirmation bias, and find that if the
degree of confirmation bias is sufficiently high then incorrect learning can occur.
Our model nests Epstein et al. (2010) and Rabin and Schrag (1999), in addition to
allowing for more sophisticated types of confirmation bias or over/underweighting
signals.
There is also a literature exploring how individuals draw inference from the
actions of others, including the failure to account for redundant information (Eyster
and Rabin, 2010; Bohren, 2016) and the analogy-based expectation equilibrium
solution concept (Jehiel, 2005) applied to a social learning setting (Guarino and
Jehiel, 2013). Bohren (2016) characterizes asymptotic learning outcomes in a model
with a single misspecified type. This agent either underestimates or overestimates
the share of autarkic agents whose actions solely reveal private information. In the
former case, beliefs may not converge if the underestimate is large, whereas in the
latter case, belief may converge to the incorrect state if the overestimate is large.
The robustness in Bohren (2016) is a special case of the robustness theorems in this
paper. Jadbabaie et al. (2012) examine learning with individuals who incorporate
their neighbors information by linearly combining their neighbors beliefs with their
own, instead of updating a fully Bayesian way. As long as individuals put sufficient
weight on their own personal signals, successful information aggregation still occurs.
Esponda and Pouzo (2016) develop the solution concept of Berk-Nash equilibria
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when players have misspecified models of the world. In a Berk-Nash equilibrium,
individuals are endowed with a set of distiributions and play optimally with respect
to the subjective distribution that minimizes relative entropy with respect to the
true distribution of outcomes when all individuals play their equilibrium strategies.
This equilibrium concept is justified the long run outcome of a learning process
where individuals under repeated play of the equilibrium strategy. We model learn-
ing directly, individuals start with two possible models of the world, play optimally
with respect to their current beliefs, and gradually learn which is correct. Esponda
and Pouzo (2017) further justify this solution concept in the concept of a Markov
decision problem played by a single player where the is uncertainty over the true
transition probability. They show that if, under the optimal policy, beliefs converge
to a steady state, the optimal strategy must converge to a Berk Nash Equilibrium of
the game. In our environment, asymptotically, if beliefs converge, individuals must
play a something analogous to a Berk Nash equilibrium; each individual is certain
that the true state of the world is a misspecified model that minimizes entropy with
respect to the true frequency of actions and signals and plays optimally with respect
to that. In addition, we characterize if beliefs converge, to which of these points
beliefs actually converge to, and allow for multiple individuals with different types
of misspecification.
Madarász and Prat (2016) explores optimal mechanism design when the prin-
cipal’s model of the individual’s preferences is misspecified. Instead of knowing
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the individual’s true preferences, the principal’s model is a finite approximation
of the truth. If the principal used the optimal mechanism for their misspecified
model, even with small amounts of misspecification they would receive low payoffs.
Madarász and Prat (2016) constructs a near-optimal mechanism is a menu of price-
product pairs that approximately obtains the optimal payoff as the misspecification
becomes small.
An older statistics literature on model misspecification complements recent work.
Berk (1966) and Kleijn and van der Vaart (2006) show that when an individual with
a misspecified model is learning by observing i.i.d. draws, her beliefs will converge
to the distribution that minimizes relative entropy from the truth. Shalizi (2009)
extends these result to a class of non-i.i.d. signal processes. He looks at the limiting
distributions of posteriors and finds that under a few assumptions the posterior con-
verges to the set of distributions that minimize the relative entropy from the truth.
Unfortunately, these assumptions do not hold in our environment. In particular
the asymptotic-equipartition property is not, in general, satisfied in social learning
environments with model misspecification.
2.2 The Common Framework
2.2.1 The Model
There are two payoff-relevant states of the world, ω ∈ {L, R}, with common prior
belief P (ω = R) = 1/2. Nature selects one of these states at the beginning of the
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game. A countably infinite set of agents T= {1, 2, ...} act sequentially and attempt
to match the realized state of the world by making a single decision at ∈ {L,R}.
Information. Agents learn from private information, public information and the
actions of other agents. Before choosing an action, each agent t observes the ordered
history of past actions (a1, ..., at−1), a private signal zt ∈ Z, where Z is an arbitrary
signal space, and the ordered history of public signals (y1, ..., yt), where y ∈ Y is
binary. Let ht = (a1, ..., at−1, y1, ..., yt−1) denote the action and public signal history.
We place several restrictions on the signal space. Suppose signals ⟨zt⟩ and ⟨yt⟩
are i.i.d. across time, conditional on the state, jointly independent, and drawn ac-
cording to probability measures µωz ∈ ∆(Z) and µωy ∈ ∆(Y) in state ω ∈ {L,R}.
Assume that no private or public signal perfectly reveals the state, which implies
that both µLz , µ
R
z and µ
L
y , µ
R
y are mutually absolutely continuous with common sup-
ports supp(µz) and supp(µy). Finally, assume that some signals are informative,
which rules out the case where both dµLz /dµ
R
z = 1 almost surely and dµ
L
y /dµ
R
y = 1
almost surely.
Given private signal z, the correctly specified private belief that the state is
L is s(z) = 1/(1 + dµRz /dµ
L
z (z)). Let c.d.f. F
ω(s) ≡ µωz (z|s(z) ≤ s) denote the
distribution of s, and let [b, b̄] ⊆ [0, 1] denote the convex hull of the common support
of private beliefs, suppF . Beliefs are bounded if 0 < b < b̄ < 1, and unbounded if
[b, b̄] = [0, 1]. Similarly, given public signal y, the correctly specified public belief
that that state is L is σ(y) = 1/(1+dµRy /dµ
L
y (y)), with c.d.f. G
ω(σ) ≡ µωy (z|σ(y) ≤
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σ) denoting the distribution of σ. The public signal is binary, so there are at most
two public beliefs, {σR, σL}, with σR ≤ 1/2 ≤ σL. Let suppG denote the common
support of Gω.
We will work directly with the correctly specified belief processes ⟨st⟩ and ⟨σt⟩,
where st ≡ s(zt) is referred to as the private signal and σt ≡ σ(yt) is referred to as
the public signal. From Lemma A.1 in Smith and Sorensen (2000) and Lemma 27
, (suppF, FL) and (σR, σL) are sufficient for the state signal distributions.
Models of Inference and Payoffs. Agent t has privately observed type θt ∈ Θ,
where Θ is a non-empty finite set and π ∈ ∆(Θ) is the distribution over types. Each
type θ specifies a payoff structure and a model of inference. The latter determines
how an agent processes information about the state from signals and prior actions.
In terms of payoffs, all types seek to choose the action that matches the hidden state,
but types differ in their costs of errors. Specifically, an agent receives a payoff of 0
if her action matches the realized state. Type θ receives a penalty of −uθ ∈ (0, 1)
from choosing action L in state R, and a penalty of −(1−uθ) from choosing action
R in state L.
Type θ’s model of inference includes (i) a (possibly misspecified) belief about
the likelihood of other types, π̂θ ∈ ∆(Θ), (ii) a (possibly misspecified) belief about
the private signal distribution, µ̂ω,θz (·|p), in each state ω ∈ {L,H} and (iii) a (possi-
bly misspecified) belief about the public signal distribution, µ̂ω,θy (·|p), in each state
ω ∈ {L,H}, where p ∈ [0, 1] is the type’s belief that the state is L after observing
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the history but before observing her private signal. This allows an agent’s misspec-
ification about the signal distribution to depend on her current belief (for example,
to capture confirmation bias). Assume that all distributions are continuous in p
under the sup norm.
We place several restrictions on the type of misspecification an agent may have
about the state signal distribution. Agents correctly believe that no private or public
signal perfectly reveals the state, which implies that both µ̂L,θz (·|p), µ̂R,θz (·|p) and
µ̂L,θy (·|p), µ̂R,θy (·|p) are mutually absolutely continuous for all p ∈ [0, 1], with common
supports supp(µ̂z) and supp(µ̂y). Agents do not observe signals inconsistent with
their models of the world, which implies supp(µ̂θz) ⊇ supp(µz) and supp(µ̂θy) ⊇
supp(µy). Lastly, an agent’s misspecification preserves the ordinal ranking of signals
in that they rank the informativeness of signals in the same order as the true signal
distribution: for any two signals z, z′ ∈ Z, if signal z leads to a higher true private
belief that the state is L than signal z′, then it also leads to a higher misspecified
private belief. Formally, for any belief p ∈ [0, 1], if dµLz /dµRz (z) ≥ dµLz /dµRz (z′), then
dµ̂L,θz /dµ̂
R,θ
z (z|p) ≥ dµ̂L,θz /dµ̂R,θz (z′|p), with equality iff dµLz /dµRz (z) = dµLz /dµRz (z′).
We make analogous assumptions for the public signal misspecification.
Given private signal z and prior belief p ∈ [0, 1], the misspecified private belief
that the state is L is ŝθ(z, p) = 1/(1+dµ̂R,θz /dµ̂
L,θ
z (z|p)). By Lemma 27 in Appendix
4.1.1, it is possible to represent the misspecified private belief as a function of the
true private belief, ŝθ(z, p) = rθ(s(z), p) for a function rθ that is strictly increasing in
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its first argument. Therefore, we can work directly with s as the private signal, and
rθ(s, p) determines the perceived posterior belief following signal s. Let F̂ ω,θ(s) ≡
µ̂ωz (z|s(z) ≤ s) denote the c.d.f. of the perceived distribution of signal s.
Similarly, we can represent the misspecified belief after observing the public
signal y and holding prior belief p as σ̂θ(y, p) = ρθ(σ(y), p), where ρθ is a function
that is increasing in its first argument with ρθ(σR, ·) ≤ 1/2 ≤ ρθ(σL, ·). We work
directly with σ as the public signal, and ρθ(σ, p) determines the perceived posterior
belief following signal σ.
Given these representations, (rθ, F̂L,θ, ρθ) is sufficient for representing type θ’s
misspecification and we do not need to keep track of the underlying misspecified
measures (µ̂Lz , µ̂
R
z , µ̂
L
y , µ̂
R
y ) (Lemma 27 in Appendix 4.1.1). Assume that∫ 1
0
1−rθ(s)
rθ(s)
dF̂L,θ(s) = 1.
We define several special types. A rational type θC has a correctly specified
model, π̂C = π, rC(s, ·) = s and ρC(σ, ·) = σ. A noise type θN believes signals
and actions are uninformative, rN(s, ·) = 1/2, ρN(σ, ·) = 1/2 and everyone else is a
noise type, π̂N = δθN . An autarkic type θA acts solely based on its private signal
and does not incorporate the history into its decision-making. It believes everyone
else is a noise type, π̂A = δθN , the public signal is uninformative, ρ
A(σ, ·) = 1/2, and
the private signal is informative, rA(s, ·) ̸= 1/2, and there exist s, s′ ∈ suppF such
that rA(s, ·) < 1/2 and rA(s′, ·) > 1/2. There can be multiple autarkic types with
different private signal misspecifications and / or an autarkic type with a correctly
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specified signal distribution. A sociable type believes actions are informative and
does learn from the history – these are the set of types who are not noise or autarkic
types.
Given a set of types Θ, let the vector (θ1, ..., θn) order Θ such that the first k
types are sociable and the remaining n − k types are autarkic or noise types. Let
ΘA denote the set of autarkic types and ΘS = (θ1, ..., θk) denote the set of sociable
types.
We focus on settings where learning is complete in the correctly specified model
– that is, an infinite amount of information is revealed through actions or public
signals. The following assumption ensures that this is the case by assuming that
either there is a positive mass of autarkic types or the public signal is informative.
Assumption 1. At least one of the following hold: (i) π(ΘA) > 0; (ii) σL > 1/2.
We also assume that sociable types have models of inference that believe actions
and/or public signals are informative.
Assumption 2. For each sociable type θ, at least one of the following hold: (i)
π̂θ(ΘA) > 0; (ii) ρ
θ(σL, ·) > 1/2.
Finally, we rule out the possibility that an agent observes action choices that are
inconsistent with her model of the world.
Assumption 3. If π(ΘA) > 0 or [b, b̄] = [0, 1], then for each sociable type θ, at
least one of the following hold: (i) π̂θ(ΘA) > 0; (ii) r
θ(b, ·) = 0 and rθ(b̄, ·) = 1.
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This ensures that when both actions occur with positive probability after any his-
tory, every sociable type expects both actions to occur with positive probability.
The timing of the game is as follows. At time t, agent t observes his type θt,
the history ht, the private signal st, then chooses action at. Then public signal yt
is realized, and the history ht+1 is updated to include (at, yt).
14
2.2.2 The Individual Decision-Problem
Consider an agent of type θi who observes history h. Using her model of inference,
she computes the probability of this history in each state, P i(h|ω), and applies
Bayes rule to form the public likelihood ratio λi(h) that the state is L versus R,
λi(h) =
P i(h|L)
P i(h|R)
.
This forms her belief P i(L|h) = λi(h)/(1+λi(h)) for interpreting the private signal
when the signal misspecification depends on her current belief, and is also sufficient
for the history. Next, the agent observes private signal s. Given public belief λi, she
uses Bayes rule to compute perceived private belief ri(s, λi/(λi + 1)) that the state
is L, where in a slight abuse of notation, we let i index the misspecified posterior
belief representation for θi. She forms posterior likelihood ratio
qi(λi, s) = λi
(
ri(s, λi/(λi + 1))
1− ri(s, λi/(λi + 1))
)
14Allowing agent t to observe yt before choosing an action does not change the results, but
complicates the notation.
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that the state is L versus R. The agent maximizes her expected payoff by choosing
action L if qi(λi, s) ≥ ui/(1− ui), and action R otherwise. For any public belief λi,
this decision rule can be represented as a cut-off rule on signal s: choose L if
s ≥ si(λi) ≡ (ri)−1
(
ui
λi(1− ui) + ui
,
λi
1 + λi
)
, (2.2.1)
otherwise choose R, where (ri)−1 is the inverse of ri in the first component. It is
common knowledge that each type maximizes payoffs subject to her posterior belief,
and therefore, the decision rule of each type is also common knowledge.
2.2.3 Examples
This framework captures many common information-processing biases and models
of reasoning about others’ action choices, and can be used to study both social and
individual learning. In social learning settings, private signals are informative and
agents have non-trivial models of inference about other agents. In individual learn-
ing settings, public signals are informative while private signals are uninformative
and agents do not learn from actions – this is isomorphic to a setting with a single
long-run agent of each type. The following examples illustrate the breadth of the
model. The latter three examples are information-processing biases that can be
incorporated into either individual or social learning settings.
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Level-k and Cognitive Hierarchy. Level-k corresponds to a model in which
agents have a misspecified belief about the distribution over types. Level-0 is the
noise type, level-1 believes all other agents are the noise type and behaves as the
autarkic type, level-2 believes all other agents are the autarkic type and interprets
all prior actions as independent private signals, level-3 believes all other agents are
level-2, and so on. The cognitive hierarchy model is similar, but allows agents to
have a richer belief structure over the types of other agents. A level-k agent have a
perceived distribution that can place positive probability on types of level-0 through
k-1.
Partisan Bias. Agents systematically overweight signals towards one state. For
example, a parameterization that overweights signals in favor of state L is r(s, p) =
sν , where ν < 1.
Confirmation Bias. Agents overweight information in favor of their prior – that
is, they overweight signals in favor of state L when the prior is high, and under-
weight signals in favor of state L when the prior is low. For example, a symmetric
parameterization is r(s, p) ≥ s if p > 1/2 and r(s, p) ≤ s if p < 1/2.
Under/Overconfidence. Agents either underweights or overweights signals. For
example,
r(s, p)
1− r(s, p)
=
(
s
1− s
)ν
,
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where ν ∈ [0, 1) corresponds to underweighting and ν ∈ (1,∞) corresponds to
overweighting.
False Consensus Effect. Agents overweight the likelihood that others have sim-
ilar preferences, when in reality preferences are heterogeneous. For example, there
are two types of agents with different costs of choosing the incorrect action, q1 ̸= q2.
However, all agents believe that other agents have the same cost, π̂1(θ1) = 1 and
π̂2(θ2) = 1.
Pluralistic Ignorance. Agents underweight the likelihood that others have sim-
ilar preferences, when in reality they do. For example, all agents have cost of
choosing an incorrect action q1, but believe that others have cost of choosing an
incorrect action q2.
2.3 Learning Dynamics
We are interested in the asymptotic learning outcomes of sociable types. Autarkic
and noise types do not learn from the history; therefore, their public beliefs are
constant across time and their behavior is stationary.
2.3.1 The Likelihood Ratio
Let λi denote the public likelihood ratio of type θi, and define λ ≡ (λ1, ..., λk) as
the vector of public likelihood ratios for sociable types (note λi = 1 for all autarkic
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types θi). Recall that the public likelihood ratio for type θi after observing history h
depends on how type θi perceives the probability of h in each state, λi(h) =
P i(h|L)
P i(h|R) .
In order to calculate λi(h), we need to determine how P
i(h|ω) depends on θi’s model
of inference.
Misspecification introduces a wedge between the perceived and actual probabil-
ity of observing each action in h, as an agent’s type influences how she interprets
each action, but the true probability of each action is determined by the true signal
and type distributions. The actual probability that an agent of type θi chooses
action L when she has public likelihood ratio λ and the state is ω is equal to the
probability of observing a private signal below the cutoff si(λ) from decision rule
(2.2.1), which is determined by the true signal distribution, F ω(si(λ)). However, so-
ciable type θj believes that θi chooses action L with probability F̂
ω,j(si(λ)), which is
θj’s perceived probability of observing a private signal is below θi’s cutoff. Similarly,
the probability of action R is equal to the probability of observing a signal above
si(λ), which is 1−F ω(si(λ)), with the perceived probability is defined analogously.
Given λ and state ω, the actual probability of action L across all types depends
on the true distribution of types,
ψ(L|ω,λ) ≡
n∑
j=1
F ω(sj(λj))π(θj).
as does the probability of action R, ψ(R|ω,λ) ≡ 1−ψ(L|ω,λ). Type θi’s perceived
probability of action L depends on her perceived distribution of types π̂i and signals
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F ω,i,
ψ̂i(L|ω,λ) ≡
n∑
j=1
F̂ ω,i(sj(λj))π̂
i(θj),
as does her perceived probability of action R, ψ̂i(R|ω,λ) ≡ 1− ψ̂i(L|ω,λ).
Each type interprets the history and forms a public likelihood ratio using her
perceived probability of actions and public signals. Given a likelihood ratio λt,
action at and public signal σt in period t, the likelihood ratio in the next period is
λt+1 = ϕ(at, σt,λt), where ϕ : {L,R} × {σL, σR} × Rn+ → Rn+, with
ϕi(a, σ,λ) ≡ λi
(
ψ̂i(a|L,λ)
ψ̂i(a|R,λ)
)(
ρi(σ, λi/(λi + 1))
1− ρi(σ, λi/(λi + 1))
)
. (2.3.1)
However, the transition probability for the likelihood ratio depends on the true
probability of each action and public signal. In a slight abuse of notation, let
ψ(a, σ|ω, λv) ≡ ψ(a|ω, λv)dGω(σ) denote the probability of action a and public sig-
nal σ when the state is ω and the current value of the likelihood ratio is λv. Given
state {at, σt,λt}, the process transitions to state {at+1, σt+1, ϕ(at, σt,λt)} with prob-
ability ψ(at+1, σt+1|ω, ϕ(at, σt,λt)). The joint stochastic process ⟨at, σt,λt⟩∞t=1 is a
discrete-time Markov process defined on {L,R} × {σL, σR} × Rn+ with λ1 = 1.
The stochastic properties of this process determine the learning dynamics for each
type.15
15When an agent’s interpretation of signals depends on her current belief, this set-up
implicitly assumes that the agent uses belief λt to interpret both st and σt. This is for notational
simplicity – the results are unchanged if the agent uses λt to interpret st, and then an interim
belief that incorporates the information from at to interpret σt.
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2.3.2 Main Result
Asymptotic Learning Characterization. Asymptotic learning outcomes are
determined by the long-run behavior of the likelihood ratio. Let incorrect learning
(for type θi) denote the event where λt → ∞k (λi,t → ∞), correct learning (for type
θi) denote the event where λt → 0k (λi,t → 0) and incomplete learning (for type
θi) denote the event where λt (λi,t) does not converge or diverge, where 0
k (∞k)
denotes the vector of all zeros (all ∞).16 We say agents asymptotically agree when
beliefs converge to an agreement vector λ ∈ {0k,∞k} and agents asymptotically
disagree when beliefs converge to a disagreement vector λ ∈ {0,∞}k \ {0k,∞k}.
Our main result characterizes the asymptotic learning outcomes in misspecified
models. In correctly specified models, the likelihood ratio is a martingale, and
the Martingale Convergence Theorem provides a powerful tool to characterize its
long-run behavior. This is not the case in a misspecified model – with even the
slightest misspecification, the likelihood ratio is no longer a martingale. This paper
uses an alternative approach – stability results from Markov dynamic systems – to
characterize learning outcomes. The characterization in Theorem 4 depends on two
expressions that are straightforward to calculate from the primitives of the model,
Θ and π.
The first expression relates to the expected movement of the likelihood ratio
near a candidate limit point. Without loss of generality, suppose that the realized
16Stationary incomplete learning, or the event where λt → λ for some λ /∈ {0,∞}k, is another
type of incomplete learning. Assumptions 1 and 2 rule this out.
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state is ω = R. Fixing a vector λ, the expected change in the log likelihood ratio
for type θi depends on the perceived and true probability of each action,
γi(λ) ≡
∑
(a,σ)∈{L,R}×{σL,σR}
ψ(a, σ|R,λ) log
(
ψ̂i(a, σ|L,λ)
ψ̂i(a, σ|R,λ)
)
. (2.3.2)
Let γ = (γ1, ..., γk). The sign of each component of γ at a candidate limit point λ
plays a crucial role in determining whether this limit point is reached with positive
probability. Define a set of vectors Λ such that for any λ ∈ Λ, γi(λ) is negative for
types with λi = 0 and positive for types with λi = ∞,
Λ ≡ {λ ∈ {0,∞}k|γi(λ) < 0 if λi = 0 and γi(λ) > 0 if λi = ∞}. (2.3.3)
Our characterization establishes that if ⟨λt⟩∞t=1 converges, then it must converge
to a limit random variable whose support lies in Λ. Intuitively, in order for the
likelihood ratio to converge to a candidate limit point with positive probability, the
likelihood ratio must move towards this limit point in expectation when it is in
the neighborhood of the limit point. It is straightforward to compute Λ from the
primitives of the model, and therefore, this result significantly simplifies the set of
possible limit beliefs. Furthermore, it is the only calculation necessary to determine
whether correct or incorrect learning arise with positive probability – these learning
outcomes arise with positive probability if and only if the corresponding limit beliefs
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0k or ∞k, respectively, are in Λ.
The second expression is a condition on how the type space is ordered. We
define a pairwise order that establishes when one type’s likelihood ratio moves
more towards state R than another type’s at a given belief λ.
Definition 2 (Pairwise Informativeness Order). Given λ, θi ≽λ θj iff
∣∣∣∣∣log
(
ψ̂i(R, σR|L,λ)
ψ̂i(R, σR|R,λ)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣∣log
(
ψ̂j(R, σR|L,λ)
ψ̂j(R, σR|R,λ)
)∣∣∣∣∣
and ∣∣∣∣∣log
(
ψ̂i(L, σL|L,λ)
ψ̂i(L, σL|R,λ)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣log
(
ψ̂j(L, σL|L,λ)
ψ̂j(L, σL|R,λ)
)∣∣∣∣∣ .
In other words, the most informative action and public signal pair in favor of state
R, (R, σR), which unambiguously decreases the likelihood ratio, is more informative
for type i than type j, and the most informative action and public signal pairs in
favor of state L, (L, σL), which unambiguously increases the likelihood ratio, is more
informative for type j than type i.
Next, we use pairwise informativeness to define a condition on how the type
space is ordered. A disagreement vector λ is total informativeness ranked if the
least pairwise informative type in the set of types with λi = 0 (limit beliefs converge
to state R) is pairwise more informative than the greatest pairwise informative type
with λi = ∞ (limit beliefs converge to state L).
Definition 3 (Total Informativeness Rank). A disagreement vector λ = (0m,∞k−m)
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is total informativeness ranked if for i = 1, ...,m and j = m+ 1, ..., k and for either
agreement vector λ ∈ {0k,∞k},
1. There exists an i∗ ≤ m such that θi ≽λA θi∗ for all i ≤ m and there exists an
j∗ > m such that θj∗ ≽λA θj for all j > m.
2. θi∗ ≻λA θj∗ .
For any disagreement vector in Λ, total informativeness rank is a sufficient condi-
tion to ensure that the likelihood ratio converges to this disagreement vector with
positive probability. Intuitively, for disagreement to occur, it must be possible to
split the beliefs for the types converging to 0 and the types converging to ∞, since
they all begin with a common prior. If the information from actions and public
signals arrives at a rate such that the least informative type converging to 0 moves
towards 0 at a faster rate than the most informative type converging to ∞ moves
towards 0, then it is possible to find finite sequences of actions and public signals
that sufficiently split beliefs. Once again, this condition is straightforward to verify
from the primitives of the model.
Given Λ and the total informativeness rank, Theorem 4 characterizes asymptotic
learning outcomes.
Theorem 4. Assume Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 and suppose ω = R.
• Correct learning occurs with positive probability if and only if 0k ∈ Λ.
• Incorrect learning occurs with positive probability if and only if ∞k ∈ Λ.
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• Agents disagree with positive probability if there exists a disagreement vector
λ ∈ Λ that is total informativeness ranked, and agents almost surely do not
disagree if Λ contains no disagreement vectors.
• Incomplete learning (non-convergence) occurs almost surely if Λ is empty, and
beliefs converge almost surely if Λ is non-empty and either (i) 0k ∈ Λ, (ii)
∞k ∈ Λ or (iii) ∃λ ∈ Λ that is total informativeness ranked.
We outline the proof for Theorem 4 in Section 2.3.3 through a series of Lemmas.
The conditions for correct and incorrect learning are tight, in the sense that
these learning outcomes obtain if and only if the respective limit beliefs are in the
set Λ. Disagreement outcomes are more challenging – while we can establish a suffi-
cient condition for disagreement to occur and a sufficient condition for disagreement
not to occur, we do not have a necessary and sufficient condition. In particular, we
cannot determine whether the likelihood ratio converges with positive probability
to a disagreement vector that is in Λ but not total informativeness ranked – whether
disagreement occurs can depend on initial beliefs and a concise necessary and suf-
ficient condition is not possible. In Section 2.4, we are able to establish necessary
and sufficient conditions for asymptotic disagreement in each application – we show
that all disagreement vectors in Λ are total informativeness ranked, and therefore,
Λ fully characterizes asymptotic learning outcomes.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 4 is that learning is complete – correct
learning occurs almost surely – in the correctly specified model. This follows from
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showing Λ = {0k} for the correctly specified model. More generally, even if some
types of agents have misspecified models, these misspecified types do not interfere
with asymptotic learning for the type that has a correctly specified model. Although
the rational type does not observe the realized type of each agent t, she has correct
beliefs about the distribution of types and is able to probabilistically parse out
the misspecified information conveyed by other types’ actions. Therefore, learning
is complete for the correctly specified type, independent of the other types in the
learning environment.
Corollary 5. Assume Assumptions 1, 2 and 3. Learning is complete for the cor-
rectly specified type θ, λθ,t → 0 almost surely.
Robustness of Complete Learning. Our second main result establishes that
the asymptotic learning properties of the correctly specified model are robust to
some misspecification, in that learning is complete for sociable types in nearby
misspecified models. This follows from the continuity of γ in each type θ’s belief
over the signal and type distributions, (π̂θ, rθ, ρθ, F̂L,θ). Since γ is the key expression
used to calculate Λ, and Λ = {0k} in the correctly specified model, Λ = {0k} is
maintained when some misspecification is introduced.
In Theorem 5, we present two sets of sufficient conditions for complete learning to
obtain for all sociable types in a misspecified model. First, if all sociable types have
perceived type and public signal distributions close enough to the true distribution,
then learning is complete. This condition places no restrictions on the perceived
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private signal distributions. Second, if all types have perceived signal distributions
close enough to the true distribution, and sociable types have an approximately
correct perceived share of autarkic types, then learning is complete. This holds
even if sociable types have very incorrect beliefs over the distribution of different
sociable or different autarkic types. For example, all sociable types may be type θ,
yet believe all sociable types are type θ′ ̸= θ. Let || · || denote the supremum metric
and r : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be the correctly specified mapping from signal to posterior
belief, r(s) = s.
Theorem 5. Assume Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 and suppose ω = R.
1. There exists a δ > 0 such that if ||π̂i−π|| < δ and ||ρi−r|| < δ for all sociable
types θi, then learning is complete.
2. There exists a δ > 0 such that if ||ri− r|| < δ, ||F̂L,i−FL|| < δ, ||ui− u|| < δ
for some u ∈ (0, 1), ||ρi − r|| < δ for all types θi, and |π̂i(ΘA)− π(ΘA)| < δ
for all sociable types θi, then learning is complete.
More generally, any form of misspecification in which the perceived probability of
each action and public signal pair is close enough to the true probability will have the
same asymptotic learning properties as the correctly specified model. We present
a more general robustness theorem, which depends on the equilibrium objects ψ
and ψ̂i. Recall that these expressions are straightforward to construct from the
primitives of the game.
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Theorem 6. Assume Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 and suppose ω = R. There exists
a δ > 0 such that if for each sociable type θi, if |ψ̂i(a, σ|R,λ) − ψ(a, σ|R,λ)| < δ
for all (a, σ,λ) ∈ {L,R} × {σL, σR} × {0,∞}k, then learning is complete for all
sociable types.
This result establishes that correct learning is obtained as long as each agent’s
perceived probabilities of actions and signals is approximately correct whenever all
types are almost certain of the state. As long as ψ̂i is close to ψ at all of the
stationary points {0,∞}k learning is correct. In addition to showing that correct
learning is robust to small misspecification, the tools in this paper allow for a precise
characterization of the exactly when correct learning is robust to misspecification.
In many interesting examples, including those developed in Section 2.4, the region
where correct learning is the unique outcome can be quite large; even agents with
misspecified models can still learn the correct state of the world in the long-run.
2.3.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Outline. We establish Theorem 4 through a series of Lemmas. In Lemma 5, we
characterize the stationary vectors of the likelihood ratio, which are candidate limit
points of ⟨λt⟩. In Lemma 6, we establish when a stationary vector λ is locally stable,
in that the likelihood ratio converges to this stationary vector with positive proba-
bility when the initial value is in a neighborhood of λ. Local stability depends on γ
defined in (2.3.2), and Lemma 6 establishes that the set Λ defined in (2.3.3) is the
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set of locally stable vectors. To fully characterize asymptotic learning outcomes, we
need to determine when the likelihood ratio converges to a stationary vector from
any initial value, which we refer to as global stability. Lemma 7 establishes that
global stability immediately follows from local stability for agreement vectors 0k
and ∞k, while Lemmas 8 and 9 establish a sufficient condition for a locally stable
disagreement vector to also be globally stable. Finally, Lemma 10 establishes that
when there is at least one globally stable vector, the likelihood ratio converges al-
most surely, and Lemma 11 rules out convergence to non-stationary vectors.
At a stationary vector, the likelihood ratio remains constant for any action that
occurs with positive probability.
Definition 7. A vector λ is stationary if for all (a, σ) ∈ {L,R} × {σR, σL}, either
(i) ψ(a, σ|ω,λ) = 0 or (ii) ϕi(a, σ,λ) = λ for for all θi ∈ ΘS.
By Assumptions 1 and 2, actions and/or public signals are informative at any inte-
rior belief. Therefore, the set of stationary vectors of the likelihood ratio correspond
to each type placing probability 1 on either state L or state R.
Lemma 5. Assume Assumptions 1 and 2. The set of stationary vectors for λ are
{0,∞}k.
Next, we determine whether the likelihood ratio converges to a given stationary
vector with positive probability. We say stationary vector λ is locally stable if the
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process ⟨λt⟩ converges to λ with positive probability when λ1 is in a neighborhood
of λ.
Definition 8. A stationary vector λ ∈ {0,∞}k is locally stable if there exists an
ε > 0, M > 0 and neighborhood N =
∏k
i=1Ni with Ni = {λ|λ < ε} if λi = 0 and
Ni = {λ|λ > M} if λi = ∞, such that P (λt → λ|λ1 ∈ N) > 0.
Recall from (2.3.2) that γi(λ) is the expected change in the log likelihood ratio for
type θi when λt = λ, with γ = (γ1, ..., γk). Lemma 6 establishes the relationship
between the local stability of λ and the sign of γi(λ) for each sociable type.
Lemma 6. Suppose ω = R and let λ ∈ {0,∞}k.
1. If γi(λ) < 0 for all θi ∈ ΘS such that λi = 0 and γi(λ) > 0 for all θi ∈ ΘS
such that λi = ∞, then λ is locally stable.
2. If there exists a θi ∈ ΘS such that λi = 0 and γi(λ) > 0 or λi = ∞ and
γi(λ) < 0, then λ is not locally stable and P (λt → λ) = 0.
Intuitively, if the likelihood ratio moves towards a stationary point in expectation
when it is within a neighborhood of the stationary point, then the stationary point
is locally stable; otherwise it is not. The likelihood ratio almost surely does not
converge to stationary points that are not locally stable. Given Lemma 6, the set
Λ defined in (2.3.3) is generically the set of locally stable vectors.
Local stability establishes convergence when the likelihood ratio is near a sta-
tionary vector; however, we are interested in determining whether convergence to
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a stationary vector occurs from any initial value of the likelihood ratio. We say a
stationary vector is globally stable if the likelihood ratio converges to it with positive
probability from any initial value.
Definition 9. A stationary vector λ ∈ {0,∞}k is globally stable if for any initial
value λ1 ∈ (0,∞)k, P (λt → λ) > 0.
Lemma 6 established that if the likelihood ratio converged to λ with positive prob-
ability, then λ is locally stable. Therefore, the set of globally stable stationary
vectors is a subset of the set of locally stable stationary vectors. It remains to es-
tablish when local stability implies global stability. It turns out that for stationary
agreement vectors, λ ∈ {0k,∞k}, global stability immediately follows from local
stability.
Lemma 7. For λ ∈ {0k,∞k}, if λ is locally stable, then λ is globally stable.
All types update their beliefs in the same directly following either an L action and
public signal σL, or an R action and public signal σR. Therefore, it is possible
to push the likelihood ratio arbitrarily close to a stationary agreement vector with
positive probability by constructing a finite sequence of action and public signal
pairs. Once the likelihood ratio is close enough to the agreement vector, local
stability guarantees convergence.
Local stability may not imply global stability for stationary disagreement vectors
λ ∈ {0,∞}k\{0k,∞k}. That is, there may exist initial values of the likelihood ratio
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such that a locally stable disagreement vector is reached with probability zero. In
contrast to agreement vectors, it is not always possible to construct a sequence of
action and public signal realizations that push the likelihood ratio arbitrarily close
to the disagreement vector. For example, if two types are sufficiently close to each
other, then disagreement may arise if their initial beliefs are very far apart, but may
not be possible if their initial beliefs are close together.
Lemma 8 establishes a sufficient condition for the global stability of a stationary
disagreement vector when there are two sociable types, k = 2. Define the matrix
A(λ) ≡
log ψ̂1(L,σL|L,λ)ψ̂1(L,σL|R,λ) log ψ̂1(R,σR|L,λ)ψ̂1(R,σR|R,λ)
log ψ̂2(L,σL|L,λ)
ψ̂2(L,σL|R,λ)
log ψ̂2(R,σR|L,λ)
ψ̂2(R,σR|R,λ)
 . (2.3.4)
Lemma 8. Suppose k = 2.
1. If (0,∞) is locally stable and either det(A(0, 0)) > 0 or det(A(∞,∞)) > 0,
then (0,∞) is globally stable.
2. If (∞, 0) is locally stable and either det(A(0, 0)) < 0 or det(A(∞,∞)) < 0,
then (∞, 0) is globally stable.
The determinant conditions in Lemma 8 guarantee that the rate of information
arrival is such that it is possible to push beliefs of different types arbitrarily far
apart. As before, once the likelihood ratio is sufficiently close to the disagreement
vector, then convergence obtains when the disagreement vector is locally stable.
74
Lemma 9 builds on Lemma 8 to establish a sufficient condition for global stability
of a stationary disagreement vector when there are more than two sociable types.
Lemma 9. If disagreement vector λ = (0m,∞k−m) is locally stable and total infor-
mativeness ranked, then (0m,∞k−m) is globally stable.
Finally, we establish when beliefs converge. If there is at least one globally stable
vector, then the likelihood ratio converges almost surely.
Lemma 10. Suppose Λ is non-empty and either (i) 0k ∈ Λ, (ii) ∞k ∈ Λ or (iii)
∃λ ∈ Λ that is total informativeness ranked. Then for any initial value λ1 ∈
(0,∞)k, there exists a random variable λ with supp(λ) ⊂ Λ such that λt → λ
almost surely.
If there are no locally stable vectors, then the likelihood ratio almost surely does
not converge, as Lemma 6 rules out convergence to non-locally stable vectors and
the following lemma rules out convergence to non-stationary vectors.
Lemma 11. If λ ∈ (0,∞)k, then P (λt → λ) = 0.
The proof of Theorem 4 immediately follows.
2.4 Applications
We next explore learning in three applications. We illustrate how to calculate the
set of asymptotic learning outcomes, Λ, and derive comparative statics for how this
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set varies with the extent of the misspecification. We also establish stronger results
about convergence to disagreement vectors for these applications.
2.4.1 Level-k Model of Inference
Set-up. Suppose that agent types correspond to a level-k model of inference with
four levels of reasoning, Θ = {θ0, θ1, θ2, θ3}.17,18 Level-0 is a noise type used to
model the beliefs of other types, but does not actually exist in the population. The
level-1, 2 and 3 types correctly interpret private information, but have misspecified
beliefs over the type distribution. Level-1 is an autarkic type – it draws inference
solely from its private signal, and is not sophisticated enough to draw inference
from the actions of others. This is modeled by specifying that level-1 types believe
prior actions are uninformative i.e. all other agents are type θ0, π̂
1(θ0) = 1.
Level-2 and level-3 are the sociable types. They believe that actions are infor-
mative, but have incorrect models of how others draw inference. Actions reflect
both private information and information from the actions of others, but level-2
types do not understand this strategic link. They believe actions solely reflect pri-
vate information and fail to account for repeated information stemming from prior
agents observing a subset of the same action history. This leads level-2 types to
overweight the informativeness of actions – their perceived type distribution places
17Costa-Gomes et al. (2009); Camerer et al. (2004).
18Of course, it is possible to allow for higher levels, k > 3. However, empirical and
experimental studies of level-k models rarely find evidence of types above level-3. Penczynski
(forthcoming) analyzes experimental data on social learning and finds evidence of level-1, level-2
and level-3 types, with a modal type of level-2, across several learning settings.
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probability one on type θ1, π̂
2(θ1) = 1.
Level-3 types have the most sophisticated reasoning. They understand that some
agents act solely based on their private information and some agents misunderstand
the strategic link between action choices and the history. However, they do not
account for the fact that there are other agents with the same level of reasoning.
They believe agents are type θ2 with probability p ∈ [0, 1), π̂3(θ2) = p, and type θ1
with probability 1 − p, π̂3(θ1) = 1 − p. If p is high, they believe most actions are
from level-2 types and underweight the informativeness of actions to counteract the
overweighting behavior of these level-2 types. If p is low, they believe most actions
are from level-1 types and, similar to level-2 types, overweight the informativeness
of actions.
We make several additional assumptions for the purposes of this example. As-
sume the true distribution of types is equally distributed across levels 1-3, π(θ1) =
π(θ2) = π(θ3) = 1/3 and there are no noise types, π(θ0) = 0. Also assume that pri-
vate signals have bounded support and are symmetrically distributed across states,
FL(1/2) = 1−FR(1/2), and there are no public signals.19 Level-1 types occur with
positive probability, and level-2 and level-3 types believe that level-1 types occur
with positive probability, so Assumptions 1 - 3 are satisfied.
19These assumptions are made for expositional simplicity. The results from Section 2.3 apply
to any level-k model in which the level-1 type occurs with positive probability, π(θ1) > 0, or
there are public signals.
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Action Choices and Beliefs. We first outline action choices and the dynamics
of beliefs for each type. Level-1 types incorporate solely their private information
into their decision and their public belief is constant across time, λ1,t = 1 for all t.
When θt = θ1, the agent chooses at = L if st ≥ 1/2 and the informativeness of her
action is independent of the history.
Level-2 types believe past actions are from level-1 types, and therefore, are in-
dependent and identically distributed. Their perceived probability of each R action
in the history is the probability that a level-1 type chooses action R, ψ̂2(R|ω,λ) =
F ω(1/2), and their perceived probability of each L action is the probability that
a level-1 type chooses action L, ψ̂2(L|ω,λ) = 1 − F ω(1/2), which are independent
of λ = (λ2, λ3). Given the symmetry assumption on F
R and FL, the difference
between the number of R and L actions, nt ≡
∑t−1
τ=1 1aτ=R − 1aτ=L, is a sufficient
statistic for the public belief of level-2 types,
λ2,t =
(
FL(1/2)
FR(1/2)
)nt
.
When θt = θ2, she chooses at = L if st ≥ 1/(λ2,t + 1). Note the informativeness of
level-2 actions does depend on the history through nt.
Level-3 types believe past actions are from either level-1 or level-2 types. Their
perceived probability of an R action at time t is a weighted average of the probability
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that level-1 and level-2 types choose action R,
ψ̂3(R|ω,λt) = pF ω
(
1
λ2,t + 1
)
+ (1− p)F ω(1/2).
The perceived probability of an L action is analogous. Both depend on the public
belief of the level-2 type, λ2,t. Therefore, how level-3 types update their public belief
following an action depends on the current belief of level-2 types. For example,
following an R action,
λ3,t = λ3,t−1
 pFL
(
1
λ2,t+1
)
+ (1− p)FL(1/2)
pFR
(
1
λ2,t+1
)
+ (1− p)FR(1/2)
 .
When θt = θ3, she chooses at = L if st ≥ 1/(λ3,t + 1).
The actual probability of an R action at time t depends on the true distribution
over types as well as the signal cut-off for each type,
ψ(R|ω,λt) =
1
3
F ω(1/2) +
1
3
F ω
(
1
λ2,t + 1
)
+
1
3
F ω
(
1
λ3,t + 1
)
.
This is the distribution that governs the transition of ⟨λ2,t, λ3,t⟩. Note that neither
level-2 nor level-3 agents have a correctly specified model of inference for any value
of p, as neither are aware of level-3 types. Thus, the correctly specified model is
not a special case of this level-k model.
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Asymptotic Learning. Next we use Theorem 4 to characterize asymptotic learn-
ing outcomes in the level-k model. There are four candidate outcomes: (0, 0) corre-
sponds to correct learning for level-2 and level-3 types, (∞,∞) corresponds to incor-
rect learning for both types, and (0,∞) and (∞, 0) are the disagreement outcomes
in which one type learns the correct state and the other learns the incorrect state.
Recall that whether an asymptotic learning outcome (λ∗2, λ
∗
3) arises depends on the
signs of the expected change in the log likelihood ratio, γ2(λ
∗
2, λ
∗
3) and γ3(λ
∗
2, λ
∗
3).
By determining how the sign of (γ2, γ3) varies with level-3’s belief p about the share
of level-2 types, we can characterize the set of candidate learning outcomes Λ (as
defined in (2.3.3)) for any p.
For example, suppose the true state is ω = R and consider the correct learning
outcome (0, 0). At (0, 0), level-2’s perceived probability of an R action in state ω is
F ω(1/2), and its perceived probability of an L action is 1−F ω(1/2). All level-2 and
level-3 types are choosing R actions at these beliefs, so the true probability of an R
action is 2/3+FR(1/2)/3. The true probability of an L action is the probability of
type θ1 times the probability this type chooses L, (1− FR(1/2))/3. From (2.3.2),
γ2(0, 0) =
(
2 + FR(1/2)
3
)
log
(
FL(1/2)
FR(1/2)
)
+
(
1− FR(1/2)
3
)
log
(
1− FL(1/2)
1− FR(1/2)
)
,
which is negative, since FR(1/2) > FL(1/2). The expression γ3(0, 0) can be con-
structed in a similar manner. Whenever γ3(0, 0) < 0, correct learning is a candidate
learning outcome, (0, 0) ∈ Λ.
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From Theorem 4, whenever (0, 0) ∈ Λ or (∞,∞) ∈ Λ, these learning outcomes
arise with positive probability. When Λ contains a disagreement outcome, we also
need to check whether the disagreement outcome satisfies the total informativeness
rank to determine whether it arises with positive probability. In this example, it
turns out that (∞, 0) is never in Λ, and at any p such that (0,∞) ∈ Λ, (0,∞) is
also total informativeness ranked. Therefore, characterizing Λ determines the set
of asymptotic learning outcomes.
Theorem 10 characterizes how asymptotic learning outcomes depend on p.
Theorem 10. Suppose ω = R. Then λt → λ∞ a.s., where λ∞ is a r.v. with
supp(λ∞) = Λ. There exist unique cutoffs 0 < p1 < p2 < p3 < 1 such that:
1. If p < p1, then incorrect and correct learning occur with positive probability,
Λ = {(0, 0), (∞,∞)}.
2. If p ∈ (p1, p2), then incorrect learning, correct learning and disagreement occur
with positive probability, Λ = {(0, 0), (∞,∞), (0,∞)}.
3. If p ∈ (p2, p3), then correct learning and disagreement occur with positive
probability, Λ = {(0, 0), (0,∞)}.
4. If p > p3, then disagreement occurs almost surely, Λ = {(0,∞)}.
When disagreement occurs, learning is correct for level-2 types and incorrect for
level-3 types.
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Intuition and Discussion. When p is low, level-3 types believe most agents are
level-1 and they behave similarly to level-2 types. The models of level-2 and level-
3 types are too similar for asymptotic disagreement to occur. Learning is either
complete or incorrect. Both types overweight the informativeness of actions, and
initial actions have an outsize effect on asymptotic beliefs, as the information from
these actions is amplified in every subsequent action. Therefore, whether initial
actions are correct or incorrect will influence whether beliefs build momentum on
the correct or incorrect state.
As p increases, level-2 and level-3 types interpret the action history in an in-
creasing different way, and disagreement becomes possible. This disagreement takes
a particular form: level-2 types learn the correct state, while the higher order of
reasoning level-3 types do not. Although level-2 types have a lower order of rea-
soning, the impact of their misspecification is mitigated by the behavior of level-3
types. As p increases, level-3 types switch to underweighting the informativeness
of actions – they believe a large share of actions are from level-2 types, and there-
fore, overweighted, so the level-3 types compensate by underweighting these actions.
Therefore, the actions of level-3 types do indeed reflect more of their private infor-
mation, mitigating level-2’s bias. Consider (∞, 0). When the beliefs of level-2 types
are near ∞ but the beliefs of level-3 types are near 0, R actions occur frequently
enough to pull level-2’s beliefs away from incorrect learning, despite level-2’s over-
weighting, and this disagreement outcome does not arise. However, when the beliefs
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of level-3 types are near ∞ but the beliefs of level-2 types are near 0, even though
R actions occur at the same frequency as near (∞, 0), level-3 underweights these R
actions, and therefore, level-3 beliefs continue moving towards the incorrect state.
Thus, beliefs can converge to (0,∞).
As p increases above p2, level-3 underweights the action history enough that
it completely cancels the overweighting of level-2 types, and level-2 can no longer
have incorrect learning. Either both types learn the correct state or they disagree
and level-3 learns the incorrect state. Finally, for p > p3, the level-3 types anti-
imitate the level-2 types so severely that they almost surely converge to believing
the incorrect state.
This characterization yields an interesting take-away on the incentives of an
agent to acquire a higher level of reasoning. Suppose that an agent of type k can
engage in costly introspection in order to increase his level of reasoning to k + 1.
If a higher level type performs strictly worse than a lower level type, then such an
agent will not seek to increase his level of reasoning, even when the cost of doing
so is arbitrarily small. Further, even if an agent already understands how to reason
like a higher level, there is still a higher cognitive cost associated with utilizing
this higher level of reasoning, as it involves more complex computations. A level-2
type simply needs to count the number of each action to make a decision, while in
addition to this computation, a level-3 type needs to back-out the beliefs of a level-2
type at each previous period to accurately extract level-2’s private information.
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Figure 2.1: Probability of Learning Outcome. (FL(s) = 53 (s
2−.04), FR = 103 (s−
1
2s
2−3/5),
suppF = [.2, .8])
Figure 2.1 plots the probability of each learning outcome, as a function of p.
Increasing p monotonically increases the probability that level-2 learns the correct
state, as level-3’s model mitigates level-2’s bias. However, increasing p has a non-
monotonic effect on the probability that level-3 learns the correct state. At first,
raising p moves level-3’s model closer to the true model, which increases the prob-
ability of complete learning, but above p = .55, increasing p moves level-3’s model
further from the true model. In this specification, p1 = .01, p2 = .55 and p3 = .76.
While this example focuses on a particular distribution, π = (0, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3), a
robustness result that is similar in spirit to Theorem 6 establishes that the learning
outcomes characterized in Theorem 10 also obtain for nearby distributions π′.
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Proof. Suppose ω = R. Let x ≡ FR(1/2) be the probability a level-1 type plays
action R. At a stationary vector (λ2, λ3), whether this vector is in Λ is determined
by the sign of
γi(λ2, λ3) = ψ(R|R, λ2, λ3) log
ψ̂i(R|L, λ2, λ3)
ψ̂i(R|R, λ2, λ3)
+ ψ(L|R, λ2, λ3) log
ψ̂i(L|L, λ2, λ3)
ψ̂i(L|R, λ2, λ3)
for each type. Consider the level-2 type. Since x > 1/2,
γ2(0, 0) = −
(
1 + 2x
3
)
log
(
x
1− x
)
< 0
γ2(∞, 0) =
(
1− 2x
3
)
log
(
x
1− x
)
< 0
γ2(0,∞) =
(
1− 2x
3
)
log
(
x
1− x
)
< 0
γ2(∞,∞) =
(
3− 2x
3
)
log
(
x
1− x
)
> 0.
Therefore, (0, 0), (0,∞) and (∞,∞) are locally stable for level-2 and (∞, 0) is not
locally stable. Consider the level-3 type.
γ3(∞,∞) =
(x
3
)
log
(
1− x
x
)
+
(
3− x
3
)
log
(
p+ (1− p)x
p+ (1− p)(1− x)
)
γ3(0,∞) =
(
1 + x
3
)
log
(
p+ (1− p)(1− x)
p+ (1− p)x
)
+
(
2− x
3
)
log
(
x
1− x
)
γ3(0, 0) =
(
2 + x
3
)
log
(
p+ (1− p)(1− x)
p+ (1− p)x
)
+
(
1− x
3
)
log
(
x
1− x
)
.
If γ3(∞,∞) > 0, then (∞,∞) ∈ Λ. From these expressions, γ3(∞,∞) is positive
at p = 0, decreasing in p and negative at p = 1. Therefore, there exists a p2 such
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that for p < p2, (∞,∞) ∈ Λ, and for p > p2, (∞,∞) /∈ Λ. If γ3(0,∞) > 0, then
(0,∞) ∈ Λ and if γ3(0, 0) < 0, then (0, 0) ∈ Λ. The expressions γ3(0, 0) < γ3(0,∞)
are both negative at p = 0, increasing in p and positive at p = 1. Therefore, there
exists p1 < p3 such that (0, 0) ∈ Λ for p < p3 and (0, 0) /∈ Λ for p > p3, while
(0,∞) /∈ Λ for p < p1 and (0,∞) ∈ Λ for p > p1.
It immediately follows from Theorem 4 that the agreement outcomes (0, 0) and
(∞,∞) arise with positive probability if and only if they are in Λ, and when at least
one agreement vector is in Λ, beliefs converge (i.e. for p < p3). It remains to show
that if (0,∞) ∈ Λ, then (0,∞) is total informativeness ranked, which establishes
that this outcome arises with positive probability if and only if it is in Λ, and also
establishes belief convergence for the case of p > p3. To apply Lemma 9, it must
be that for some λ ∈ {(0, 0), (∞,∞)}, θ2 ≽λ θ3. This is satisfied for ≽(0,0). In
particular,
|g2(R, (0, 0))| =
∣∣∣∣log(1− xx
)∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣log(p+ (1− p)(1− x)p+ (1− p)x
)∣∣∣∣ = |g3(R, (0, 0))|
g2(L, (0, 0)) = log
(
x
1− x
)
= g3(L, (0, 0)).
Intuitively, both types make the same inference from L actions around (0, 0), which
they believe must come from a level-1 type. But the level-2 type believes that R
actions are stronger evidence of state R than the level-3 type, because the level-3
type underweights the informativeness of these actions to account for the possibility
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of level-2 types. Therefore, the conditions for the pairwise informativeness order
defined in Definition 2 are satisfied, θ2 ≽(0,0) θ3. Given that these are the only two
types, the conditions in Definition 9 for (0,∞) to be total informativeness ranked
are also satisfied.
2.4.2 Partisan Bias
Set-up. Suppose that there are two ways in which agents process private infor-
mation. Some individuals – who we refer to as partisan types – systematically slant
private information in favor of state L. Following any private signal, these parti-
san types will believe that state L is more likely than it actually is, given the true
measure over signals.
Other individuals are unbiased in that they correctly interpret private informa-
tion. Although partisan and unbiased agents agree on the optimal action choice
when the state is known, they will potentially disagree on the optimal action choice
following imperfect signals, as the partisan types will believe that signals are more
favorable towards state L than unbiased types.
Formally, there are four types, Θ = {θP , θU , θAP , θAU}. Some partisan and
unbiased agents observe the history and others do not. The types θP and θU are
sociable types who learn from the action history, while θAP and θAU are autarkic
types who act solely based on private information. Types θP and θAP are partisan
in that they have a misspecified private signal distribution that slants information
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in favor of state L, rP (s, p) = sν for some ν ∈ (0, 1). The unbiased types θAU and
θU correctly interpret private signals. Suppose that suppF = [0, 1] and F̂
L,P (s) =
FL(sν). This implies that F̂R,P (s) = FR(sν). Moreover, this implies that the
frequency that a partisan type expects to have beliefs less than or equal to ŝ is
exactly F̂ ω,P (ŝ1/ν) = F ω,P (ŝ).
Whenever a partisan type sees a signal z, they interpret it like a correctly spec-
ified type would interpret a signal z′, which is stronger evidence of L. For instance,
someone who is primed to believe that vaccines are dangerous may look at a study
and believe that the results were falsified to some degree by the organization that
released the study, so a study that looks like signal z was in actuality study z′ before
it was manipulated.
In the presence of partisan types, there is an additional challenge in learning
from the actions of other agents, relative to a model in which all agents correctly
interpret the state signal distribution. To accurately interpret actions, an agent
must be aware of the partisan types, and know both the form of their bias (i.e.
ν) and their frequency in the population. We assume that agents are not this
sophisticated. In particular, both partisan and unbiased types believe that all agents
interpret private information in the same manner as themselves. Although unbiased
types have a correct model of the state signal distribution, they incorrectly assume
that all other agents do as well. Therefore, they do not invert the bias of the
partisan types when learning from actions. This corresponds to believing that no
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types have partisan bias, π̂U(θAP ) = π̂
U(θP ) = 0. Similarly, partisan types believe
π̂P (θAP ) = π̂
P (θP ) = 1. This, combined with the specification of F̂
L,P (s) implies
that both types have the same likelihood ratio expect to see R actions to occur at
frequency F ω(s̄U(λ)). In the context of the vaccine example, this means that the
partisan types believe that no other types are adjusting for the possibility that the
studies had been manipulated.
Both partisan and unbiased types correctly understand how to separate private
information from redundant information in actions – that is, they have correct
beliefs about the share of autarkic types in the population, π̂P (θAU) = π(θAU) +
π(θAP ) = πP and π̂
U(θAU) = π(θAU) + π(θAP ) = p.
We make several additional assumptions for the purposes of this example. Sup-
pose that there are no unbiased autarkic types, π(θAU) = 0, and a positive share
of partisan autarkic types, π(θAP ) = πP > 0. Assume that there are no public sig-
nals. Autarkic types occur with positive probability, and both sociable types believe
autarkic types occur with positive probability, so Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied.
Given λP , non-autarkic partisan type uses cut-off s
P =
(
1
1+λP
)1/ν
and autarkic
partisan type uses cut-off sAP = (0.5)1/ν
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Suppose ω = R
γP (0) = (p+ (1− p)FR(0.51/ν)) log
(
p+ (1− p)F̂L(0.51/ν)
p+ (1− p)F̂R(0.51/ν)
)
+
(1− p)(1− FR(0.51/ν)) log
(
1− F̂L(0.51/ν)
1− F̂R(0.51/ν)
)
γP (∞) = ((1− p)FR(0.51/ν)) log
(
F̂L(0.51/ν)
F̂R(0.51/ν)
)
+
(p+ (1− p)(1− FR(0.51/ν))) log
(
p+ (1− p)(1− F̂L(0.51/ν))
p+ (1− p)(1− F̂R(0.51/ν))
)
Incorrect Learning. When partisan bias is severe and in favor of the incorrect
state, misunderstanding that some agents have partisan bias can lead almost surely
learning the incorrect state. When partisan bias favors the correct state, learning
is complete regardless of the level of bias. Theorem 11 characterizes the limiting
distribution of the biased type’s likelihood ratio in each state.
Theorem 11. Suppose ω = R. There exist cutoffs ν1 ∈ (0, 1) and ν2 ∈ (0, ν1) such
that
1. If ν > ν1, then learning is incorrect a.s.
2. If ν ∈ (ν2, ν1), then learning is incomplete and beliefs do not converge a.s.
3. If ν < ν2, then learning is correct a.s.
When ω = L, then learning is correct a.s.
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Figure 2.2: Regions of Stability. (πP = .9, FL(s) = s2, FR = 2s− s2, suppF = [0, 1])
Proof. Let xωP be the probability that the biased plays action R and x
ω
U ≡ F ω(1/2)
be the probability that a correctly specified type would play action R in state ω.
Then xRP ≤ xRU and xLP ≤ xLU , since partisan types slant information in favor of state
L. Moreover, action R occurs more often in state R, so xRP > x
L
P and x
R
U > x
L
U .
Since there is only one sociable type, local stability implies global stability.
Suppose ω = R. To determine whether ∞ ∈ Λ, we need to determine the sign
of
γ(∞) = (πP (1− xRP ) + 1− πP ) log
(
πP (1− xLU) + 1− πP
πP (1− xRU) + 1− πP
)
+ xRPπP log
(
xU
xRU
)
.
At xRP = x
R
U , γ(∞) is negative. At xRP = 0, γ(∞) is positive. Moreover, it is strictly
decreasing in xRP . Therefore, there exists a cutoff x1 ∈ (0, xRU) such that for xRP < x1,
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γ(∞) > 0, so ∞ is locally stable, and for xRP > x1, γ(∞) < 0, so ∞ is not locally
stable.
To determine local stability of λ = 0, we need to sign
γ(0) = (πP (1− xRP ) log
(
1− xU
1− xRU
)
+ (xRPπP + 1− πP ) log
(
πPxU + 1− πP
πPxRU + 1− πP
)
.
As before, γ(∞) is decreasing in xRP , negative at xRP = xRU and positive at xRP = 0.
Therefore, there exists a cutoff x2 ∈ (0, xRU) such that for xRP < x2, γ(0) > 0, so 0 is
not locally stable, and for xRP > x2, γ(0) < 0, so 0 is locally stable.
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Figure 2.3: Cut-off on ν for Learning Outcome. (πP = .9, FL(s) = s2, FR = 2s − s2,
suppF = [0, 1])
So, when agents are approximately correcting for the mistakes being made in
the update rule, when ν is close to 1, agents are still able to learn correctly in
the long run and as the bias becomes severe, agent fail to account for it and learn
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the incorrect state. Finally, there is this intermediate region where beliefs do not
converge. Due to social learning, agents believe L actions are not very informative
when beliefs are close to λ = ∞ so beliefs don’t converge to ∞, but also don’t
correct for bias enough when beliefs are close to λ = 0, so beliefs never converge to
0.
2.4.3 Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias is well documented in the literature. Lord et al. (1979) shows
that when asked to read two studies, one which supports capital punishment and
one that doesn’t, opponents and proponents of capital punishment weigh the study
that confirms their priors more heavily. Darley and Gross (1983) found that af-
ter being told a child’s socioeconomic background subjects were more likely to
rate her performance on a reading test lower if they knew she came from a low
socioeconomic background. Plous (1991) documents that, when faced with a non-
catastrophic breakdown of a given technology, supporters of the technology become
more confident that the safeguard in place will prevent a catastrophic breakdown,
while opponents will believe that a catastrophic breakdown is more likely.
Suppose that agents exhibit confirmation bias, they underweight information
that contradicts their prior beliefs. Specifically, let Θ = {θ}. There are only public
signals20 which this type misinterprets to favor her prior beliefs. Public signals have
20private signals are uninformative and believed to be uninformative F̂ω(1/2) = Fω(1/2) = 1
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σ ∈ {σL, σR}. Each agent interprets signals according to
ρ(σ, p) =

σ if σ = σL and p ≥ 12 or σ = σR and p ≤
1
2(
1− ϱ(p)
k
)
σ + ϱ(p)
k
1
2
otherwise.
where k > 1 and f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a symmetric around p = 1/2, continuous,
ϱ(0) = ϱ(1) = 1 and ϱ(·) is decreasing on [0, 1/2]. Under this specification agents
underweight signals that do not conform to their prior belief, and this bias becomes
more severe as an agents prior becomes more extreme. The limit as k → ∞ is the
correctly specified model.
Theorem 12. Suppose ω = R. There exists a cutoff k̄ > 1/2 such that
• If k ≥ k̄ then learning is correct a.s.
• If k ≤ k̄ then both correct and incorrect learning occur with positive probability.
Proof. In the correctly specified model, γ(0) < 0 and γ(∞) < 0. As k → ∞, γ
approaches the γ from the correctly specified model, so correct learning obtains
almost surely. Specifically,
γ(0) = σR log
(
1− ϱ(0)
k
)
σL +
ϱ(0)
2k
1−
(
1− ϱ(0)
k
)
σL − ϱ(0)2k
+ σL log
σR
σL
γ(∞) = σL log
(
1− ϱ(1)
k
)
σR +
ϱ(1)
2k
1−
(
1− ϱ(1)
k
)
σR − ϱ(1)2k
+ σR log
σL
σR
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As k → ∞ these approach
γ(λ) = σR log
σL
σR
+ σL log
σR
σL
< 0.
Moreover, γ(0) is increasing in k and γ(∞) is decreasing in k. Correct learning
always occurs with positive probability, while incorrect learning can only occur if k
is low enough. Finally, at k = 1,
γ(∞) = σL log 1 + σR log
σL
σR
< 0
so a cutoff k̄ must exist.
Confirmation bias leads to agents misinterpreting signals that don’t conform
to their preconceived notions. So, if the confirmation bias is severe enough, it
is very unlikely that agents will see enough information to overturn their prior
misconceptions, so incorrect learning can occur with positive probability. An initial
set of signals in favor of state L causes agents to fall into a trap that their bias
makes it difficult to recover from. But, if confirmation bias is relatively low, agents
will eventually see enough public signals that run counter to their prior beliefs to
overcome their preconceptions. This is similar to the results from Rabin and Schrag
(1999).21
21In fact, a minor extension to our framework allows us to nest the model of Rabin and
Schrag (1999). To accommodate their model, we need four public signals as opposed to the two
we allow for in this paper. All results presented in this paper readily extend to the case of a
finite number of public signals, the restriction to two public signals has been made to avoid
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Figure 2.4: Probability of Learning Outcome. (ϱ(p) =
(
1
2 · |p− 1/2|
) 1
8 , σL = 5/8, σR =
3/8)
2.5 Conclusion
Asymptotically correct learning, in which individuals converge to placing probability
one on the correct state, is no longer guaranteed with misspecified agents. When
agents’ models for the world are misspecified, learning may converge to putting
probability one on the wrong state, individuals may perpetually disagree, and be-
liefs may never converge at all. Our paper provides a general framework for model
misspecification and establishes how the potential asymptotic learning outcomes de-
pend on the primitives of the model – the ways in which agents misinterpret private
and public information, and draw inference from the actions of others. We show
that the correctly specified model is robust to any of these forms of misspecification,
cumbersome notation. The mapping between this paper and Rabin and Schrag (1999) is detailed
in appendix 4.2.
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in that correct learning is guaranteed for approximately correctly specified models.
We also show that when the misspecification is severe, then correct learning is no
longer guaranteed, and other asymptotic outcomes arise with positive probability.
These results unify a diverse literature on particular types of misspecification that
have already been studied, and yield insights into new forms of misspecification.
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3 Appendix: Promoting a Reputation for Quality
Appendix 1 - Good News Proofs
Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2
These proofs are similar to the corresponding arguments in Board and Meyer-
ter-Vehn (2013).
Lemma 1
Proof. These conditions follow from Lemma 5 of Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013).
They show that the function ψ(t) =
∫∞
t
e−
∫
ρ(s)ϕ(t)dt is the unique bounded solution
to
f(t) =
∫ ∞
t
ϕ(s)− ρ(s)f(s)ds.
So the value function can be rewritten as
V (x, θ) = max
a,π
∫ ∞
0
xt + A(xt, θ)(λD(xt)− c) + Π(xt, θ)1θ=H(∆(xt)− k)
+ λV (xt, L)− λV (xt, θ)− rV (xt, θ)dt,
where xt solves ẋt = (Ãt − xt)λ− Π̃txt(1− xt) with x0 = x.
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Therefore the optimal a(xt, ω) solves
max
a∈[0,1]
λD(xt)a− ca
and the optimal π(xt, H) solves
max
π∈[0,π̄]
∆(xt)π − kπ.
since these maximize the integrand pointwise.
Lemma 2
Proof. Subtracting the two value functions gives
D(x) =
∫ ∞
0
π(xt, H)(∆(xt)− k)− (r + λ)D(xt)dt.
Using Lemma 5 of Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013) again,
D(x) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+λ)tπ(xt, H)(∆(xt)− k)dt.
Lemma 12. If x0 > x
∗
0 then xt ≥ x∗t for all t < τ , where τ is the first time news
arrives.
Proof. Both xt and x
∗
t are continuous in t. If xt = x
∗
t at any t, then for any s > t,
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xs and x
∗
s both solve
ẋs = λ(a(xs)− xs)− π(xs, H)xs(1− xs).
with the same initial condition. Since the solution to this is the unique solution
that is consistent with the discrete time approximation, x∗s and xs must be equal.
So if xt and x
∗
t cross, they must be the same from then on, so xt ≥ x∗t .
This implies that the value functions are increasing in x. For any two initial con-
ditions, x > x′, the firm facing a sequence of consumers with prior x0 = x could
instead follow the strategy it would have followed if it faced a sequence of con-
sumers with prior x0 = x
′. This would induce the same probability measure over
signals, quality shocks, and quality. Moreover, by Lemma 12, the flow payoffs would
be strictly higher than they were for the firm that starts at x′. Since equilibrium
payoffs must be (weakly) greater than this, value functions must be increasing.
Therefore, V (x, ω) is increasing in x.
The value of a signal ∆(x) = V (1, H) − V (x,H) is decreasing since V (x,H) is
increasing.
The high quality firm gets a higher payoff than the low quality firm since it can
generate the exact same distribution over signals and quality as a firm that starts
with low quality. So V (x,H) ≥ V (x, L).
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Finally, D(x) is decreasing. This difference can be written as
∫ ∞
0
π(xt, H)[∆(xt)− k]dt,
where π(xt, H) maximizes
π(xt, H)[∆(xt)− k].
For larger xt, ∆(xt) − k is smaller. Therefore, if beliefs start at a larger x0, the
integrand is smaller pointwise. So D(x) is decreasing.
Proposition 1 - Existence and Structure
The result that the equilibrium can be characterized in terms of two cutoffs follows
directly from the monotonicity properties. Existence of equilibrium and x∗∗ ≥ x∗
are slightly more involved.
Lemma 13. In any equilibrium, there exists points x∗∗ and x∗ such that
a(x) =

1 if x < x∗
0 if x > x∗
,
π(x,H) =

π̄ if x < x∗∗
0 if x > x∗∗
.
Moreover, x∗∗ ≥ x∗.
101
Proof. Consider any equilibrium, let x∗ be the highest public belief where the firm
invests in quality22 and let x∗∗ be the highest public belief where the firm promotes.
Suppose, that x∗ > x∗∗. Then consider any belief x′ ∈ (x∗, x∗∗) where the firm
invests. There are a few possibilities that must be considered.
If beliefs are drifting up or are constant at this point, then they never cross x∗.
If the firm followed this strategy there would be no arrivals of news and the firm
would receive ∫
e−rt[xt − cat]dt.
Therefore the firm prefers to never work, since it gets a payoff of
∫∞
0
e−rtxt from
never working.
It remains to to consider the case where beliefs are drifting down at all points in
(x∗, x∗∗). Since beliefs would be drifting up if a(x′) = 1, and the firm is assume
to be investing, it must be that a(x′) ∈ (0, 1). This can only happen if D(x) = c
λ
,
for all x′ − ε < x < x′ and some ε > 0, since the firm needs to choose a level of
investment in (0, x) for beliefs to drift down. This means that D(x) = c
λ
for all
x ∈ (x∗, x∗∗). But
D(x′) =
∫ t+δ
t
e−(r+λ)0 dt+ e−(r+λ)δD(x)
for sufficiently small δ and some x, s.t. x′ − ε < x < x′. So D(x′) < c
λ
, but the firm
22It follows from this proposition that it is also the lowest x where the firm doesn’t invest
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was assumed to be exerting effort at that point, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, x∗∗ ≥ x∗. Moreover, D(x) cannot be constant below x∗ because
π(xt, H)(∆(xt)− k) = π̄(∆(xt)− k),
so for any two beliefs x, x′ below x∗, D(x0) > D(x
′
0) if x
′
0 > x0 since the integrand
at any point x′t is strictly less than the integrand at xt.
A MPE Exists
Proposition 11. A Markov Perfect Equilibrium Exists.
Proof. Let Uθ : [0, 1]
3 → R as
Uθ(x0, x
∗, x∗∗) = max
a,π
Ea,π
(∫
e−rt[xt(x
∗, x∗∗)− cat − kπt]dt|θ0 = θ, x0 = x
)
where xt(·) behaves as follows. The firm is believed to be playing according to
cutoffs x∗ and x∗∗. So the firm works below x∗ and promotes below x∗∗. Belief
follow the modified the law of motion induced by Bayes rule and are consistent
with admissibility23.
23Specifically when the drift switches signs so that its positive below the cutoff and negative
above the cutoff, it is 0 at the cutoff, at any cutoff where the drift doesn’t change sign, the choice
of strategy doesn’t matter.
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Let
Γ(x∗, x∗∗) =

argminx̂∗∈[0,1]
∫ 1
x̂∗
λ(UH(s, x
∗, x∗∗)− UL(s, x∗, x∗∗))− c ds
argminx̂∗∗∈[0,1]
∫ 1
x̂∗∗
UH(1, x
∗, x∗∗)− UH(s, x∗, x∗∗)− k ds
.
Since the value functions are bounded, the objective functions are continuous and
well defined, so this operator is well defined and non-empty. By the monotonicity
of D(s, x∗, x∗∗) = UH(s, x
∗, x∗∗)−UL(s, x∗, x∗∗) and ∆(s, x∗, x∗∗) = UH(1, x∗, x∗∗)−
UH(s, x
∗, x∗∗) this is convex valued.
Continuity in Initial Values
Lemma 14. For given cutoffs (x∗∗, x∗) and for any ε > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such
that for any x̂0 ∈ [x0 − δ, x0 + δ] and any history then
∫
e−rt|xt(x∗, x∗∗)− x̂t(x∗, x∗∗)|dt ≤ ε.
Lemma 15. Uθ(·, x∗, x∗∗) is continuous in the first argument.
Lemma 7
Proof. After the first arrival, beliefs coincide forever, so it is sufficient to show that
x̂t and xt stay close together before an arrival. For some cases, it may be easier
to consider the log likelihood ratio lt = log(xt/(1 − xt)). Fix l0 > l̂0 > l0 − δ, the
argument is analogous for the other case.
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1. l0 and l̂0 are in the work/no promote region.
lt and l̂t are both drifting at up at rate λ(1 + e
−l), which is decreasing in l,
so these beliefs are getting closer together. Since the drift at x∗ = 0, beliefs
never leave this region. Therefore, as long as |l0 − l̂0| < rε then |lt − l̂t| < rε
for all t.
2. l0 is in the work/no promote region, l̂0 is in the work/promote region.
This implies that x∗ > x∗∗.
lt and l̂t are both drifting up. l̂t drifts up at least at rate λ− π̄, so it reaches
x∗∗ in finite time. Then beliefs are in the situation from 1. So if |l0 − l̂0| < δ,
the time it takes for l to reach l∗∗ is at most δ/(λ−π̄). In that amount of time,
l̂t is at most drifting up at rate λ, so |lt− l̂t| < λδλ−π̄ for any time t ≤ δ/(λ− π̄).
Then, as long as λδ
λ−π̄ < rε, by the argument from 1. for any t >
δ
λ−π̄ ,
|lt − l̂t| < rε.
3. l0 is in the shirk/promote region or the shirk/no promote and l̂0 is in the
work/promote region.
x∗ is convergent, the drift above the cutoff is negative and the drift below the
cutoff is positive, so beliefs are drifting together. As long as |l0 − l̂0| < rε,
then |lt − l̂t| < rε.
4. l0 and l̂t = 0 are both in the work/promote region.
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The reputational drift λ(1+e−l)− π̄ is decreasing in the work/promote region,
so beliefs are drifting closer together as long as they both lie in that region.
If x∗ < x∗∗, then beliefs never leave this region and otherwise they eventually
are in the situation from case 2. In either case, there exists a sufficiently small
δ such that if |l0 − l̂0| < δ then |lt − l̂t| < rε for all t.
5. lt is in the shirk/no promote region, l̂t is in the work/no promote region.
lt is drifting down while l̂t is drifting up, so as long as |l̂0 − l0| < rε, then
|lt − l̂t| < rε.
6. lt and l̂t are in the shirk/promote region.
In this region, xt and x̂t are determined by a standard differential equation
of the form x′(t) = f(x, t) and x0 = x, f(x, t) is a continuous function and is
lipschitz in x, so by standard results from the differential equation literature, it
is continuous in the initial conditions until x̂ leaves the shirk/promote region.
If the shirk/promote cutoff is interior, δ can be chosen so that beliefs are
at most δ′ apart when they hit that cutoff, in which case an argument from
a previous case applies. Otherwise δ can be chosen so that beliefs are at
most δ′ apart when x̂t hits 1/2, after which, the xt and x̂t only drift apart a
small amount more before xt hits 1/2 and they start drifting together since
ẋt − ˙̂xt = λ(x̂t − xt) + π̄(x̂t(1− x̂t)− xt(1− xt)) < 0 below 1/2.
7. lt is in the shirk/no promote region, l̂t or the shirk/promote region. lt is
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drifting down at least at rate λ, so it enters the shirk/promote region in
at most time δ/λ. So, the most beliefs can seperate before lt enters the
shirk/promote region, after which we are in the previous case. So δ can be
choosen so that these beliefs never drift far apart.
8. lt and l̂t are in the shirk/no promote region.
In this region ẋt − ˙̂xt = λ(x̂t − xt) < 0, so beliefs are drifting close together
until they enter a region from one of the other cases.
Finally, bounding the distance between the likelihood ratios is sufficient because,
by the mean value theorem
|xt − x̂t| ≤ max
x
1
( d
dx
log x/(1− x))
|lt − l̂t| ≤ |lt − l̂t|.
Lemma 8
Proof. This follows directly from the previous claim. The optimal strategy is in-
dependent of the initial conditions, and xt is continuous in the initial condition, so
Uθ(·, x∗, x∗∗) must be continuous.
Continuity in Cutoffs
Lemma 16. Uγθ (x0, x
∗, x∗∗) is continuous in x∗ and x∗∗.
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Proof. It is sufficient to show that for cutoffs (x∗, x∗∗) there is a δ > 0 s.t. (x̂∗, x̂∗∗) ∈
[x∗ − δ, x∗ + δ]× [x∗∗ − δ, x∗ + δ] such that
Ea,π
(∫
e−rt[xt(x
∗, x∗∗)− x̂t(x̂∗, x̂∗∗)|dt
)
≤ ε.
since
Uθ(x0, x
∗, x∗∗) ≥ Eâ,π̂
(∫
e−rt[xt − cat − kπt]dt|θ0 = θ, x0 = x
)
≥ Ea,π
(∫
e−rt[x̂t − cât − kπ̂t]dt|θ0 = θ, x0 = x
)
− ε
≥ Uθ(x0, x̂∗, x̂∗∗)
where â, π̂ is the optimal strategy if the cutoffs are x̂∗ and x̂∗∗. Since the problem
is symmetric, this implies that Uθ is continuous.
Continuity in x∗. Fix x∗∗ and a strategy profile (a, π). I need to show that for
any ε > 0 there’s a δ s.t. for x̂∗ ∈ [x∗ − δ, x∗ + δ] then
∫
e−rt|xt − x̂t|dt ≤ ε.
Its convenient to define some terms here. A cutoff X convergent if limx→X+ g(x) ≥
0, limx→X− g(x) ≤ 0, divergent if limx→X+ g(x) < 0 and limx→X− g(x) > 0 and
permeable if it is neither convergent or divergent. At a convergent cutoffs, beliefs
that start in a neighborhood of the cutoff converge to it, and stay there until an
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arrival, at a divergent cutoff beliefs are pushed away from it, and at a permeable
cutoff beliefs cross the cutoff and continue to drift in the same direction.
Any investment cutoff x∗ is convergent. Since λ ≥ π̄, below x∗ beliefs must be drift-
ing up, and above it beliefs are drifting down. Therefore, x∗ must be a convergent
cutoff.
Let x̂∗ ∈ [x∗,min(x∗+ rε, 1)]. Then either x̂∗ is convergent, or the convergent point
for the x̂ process is between x̂∗ and x∗. The largest possible distance between the
two processes is the distance between these two cutoffs, since beliefs coincide until
they hit the cutoffs, and then get stuck at the two convergent points until an arrival.
So |x̂t − xt| ≤ rε.
This argument can be reversed to show continuity in the other direction.
Continuity in x∗∗. Fix investment cutoff x∗. For any ε > 0, there exists a δ > 0
such x̂∗∗ ∈ [x∗∗, (x∗∗ + δ)] then |x̂t − xt| < rε.
x∗∗ is a permeable cutoff. Let T be the time such that x̂T = x
∗∗. For any x0, beliefs
drift at the same rate unless x0 > x
∗∗ and drift at the same rate until they enter
the region between x̂∗∗ and x∗. So it is sufficient to show that δ can be chosen so
that the most beliefs can separate from initial condition x̂∗∗ is bounded by rε.
After xt crosses x
∗∗ beliefs follow the same law of motion, just with different initial
conditions, so for any ε there exists a δ′ > 0 such that as long as |x̂T − xT | < δ′
then |x̂t − xt| < rε for all t > T .
If x∗∗ = 0, then if δ < rε it must be that |x̂t−xt| < rε. Otherwise, xt drifts down at
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least at rate −λx∗∗ while x̂t drifts down by at most −λx̂∗∗ − 14 π̄ before time T . So,
the furthest apart beliefs can drift before time T is (1
4
π̄+λ(x̂∗∗−x∗∗))T . Moreover,
T < δ/(λx∗∗). So, δ can be chosen so that for any x0, |x̂t − xt| < rε, and therefore∫
e−rt|xt − x̂t|dt ≤ ε.
This argument can be reversed to show continuity in the other direction.
By the dominated convergence theorem, the objective function is continuous. Γ is
UHC, convex valued (by monotonicity of ∆(·) and D(·)), compact valued and non-
empty. So it has a fixed point. This fixed point satisfies the sequential rationality
conditions for the law of motion induced by the fixed point since they are fixed
points of
Γ(x∗, x∗∗) =

argminx̂∗∈[0,1]
∫ 1
x̂∗
λ(UH(s, x
∗, x∗∗)− UL(s, x∗, x∗∗))− c ds
argminx̂∗∗∈[0,1]
∫ 1
x̂∗∗
UH(1, x
∗, x∗∗)− UH(s, x∗, x∗∗)− k ds
,
and since value functions are monotone, the optimal cutoffs satisfy
UH(s, x
∗, x∗∗)− UL(s, x∗, x∗∗) ≥ (≤)c/λ
below (above) the fixed point x∗ and
UH(1, x
∗, x∗∗)− UH(s, x∗, x∗∗) ≥ (≤)k
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below (above) the fixed point x∗∗. So, this fixed point constitutes an equilibrium.
Propositions 4 - Limit Behavior
Proposition 4 As c→ 0, there is a unique limit. In the limit as c→ 0, equilibrium
payoffs are increasing in k as long as λ ≥ π̄.
Lemma 17. For any sequence cn → 0 and for any sequence of equilibria, |x∗n −
x∗∗n | → 0.
Suppose not. Then there exists an ε > 0 and a subsequence s.t. |x∗nk − x
∗∗
nk
| > ε for
all k. I’m going to drop the k subscript for convenience. Consider ∆n(x
∗
n). This
can be rewritten as
∆n(x
∗
n)− k = Vn(1, H)− k − Vn(x∗n, H);
= Vn(x
∗∗
n , H)− Vn(x∗n, H);
>
∫ ∞
T ∗∗
e−(r+π̄+λ)t[(xn,t − x∗n) + λ(Vn(xn,t, L)− Vn(x∗n, L))]dt;
>
∫ ∞
T ∗∗
e−(r+π̄+λ)t[(xn,t − x∗n)]dt.
The first inequality comes from considering the deviation where after beliefs hit x∗∗,
the firm plays the strategy it would have played at x∗ and the second comes from
the monotonicity of the value function.
From the firm’s perspective, the worst possible law of motion for xn,t is bounded
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below by −λ− 1
4
π̄ until xn,t = x
∗ and then ẋn,t = 0 after that. This gives
∆(x∗)− k >
∫ ε
λ+14 π̄
0
e−(r+π̄+λ)(ε− (λ+ 1
4
π̄)u)du = B.
But, as n→ ∞, c→ 0. Moreover,
D(x∗n) >
∫
e−(r+λ)t[B]dt =
1
r + λ
B
But, λD(x∗n) ≤ cn for all n by sequential rationality and cn → 0. This is a contra-
diction. So |x∗n − x∗∗n | must converge.
Lemma 18. The cutoff x∗∗n converges to a unique cutoff. Cutoff determined by
solution to:
rk =
r
r + λ
+
λ
r + λ
e−(r+λ)T − e−λT ,
where x∗∗ = e−λT .
Suppose that the sequence of x∗∗n ’s did not converge to the cutoff x
∗∗. Let T ∗n be the
amount of time it takes for beliefs to go from 1 to x∗n. Then there exists an ε > 0
s.t. ∣∣∣∣rk − ( rr + λ(1− e−(r+λ)T ∗n ) + e−(r+λ)T ∗n − e−λT ∗n
)∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε
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infinitely often. The value function can be rewritten as
Vn(1, H) =
∫ T ∗∗n
0
e−(r+λ)txn,t + λVn(xn,t, L)dt;
+
∫ T ∗n
T ∗∗n
e−(r+λ)t−π̄(t−T
∗∗
n )[xn,t + π̄(Vn(1, H)− k) + λVn(xn,t, L)]dt
+ e−(r+π̄+λ)T
∗
nVn(x
∗, H);
=
∫ T ∗∗n
0
e−rtxn,tdt+
∫ ∞
T ∗∗n
e−ruxn,u(1− e−λT
∗
n )
+
∫ T ∗n
T ∗∗n
e−(r+π̄+λ)t[xn,t + π̄(Vn(1, H)− k) + λVn(xn,t, L)]dt
+ (e−(r+λ)T
∗
n − 1)[x∗n + c].
And using the indifference condition at the cutoff and the convergence of the two
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cutoffs,
Vn(1, H)− Vn(x∗∗, H) =
∫ T ∗∗n
0
e−rtxn,tdt+
∫ ∞
T ∗∗n
e−ruxn,u(1− e−λT
∗
n )
+
∫ T ∗n
T ∗∗n
e−(r+π̄+λ)t[xn,t + π̄(Vn(1, H)− k) + λVn(xn,t, L)]dt
+ (e−(r+λ)T
∗
n − 1)[x∗n + c]− Vn(x∗∗, H)
∆(x∗∗) =
∫ T ∗∗n
0
e−rtxn,tdt+
∫ ∞
T ∗∗n
e−ruxn,u(1− e−λT
∗
n )
+
∫ T ∗n
T ∗∗n
e−(r+π̄+λ)t[xn,t + π̄(Vn(1, H)− k) + λVn(xn,t, L)]dt
+ (e−(r+λ)T
∗
n − 1)[x∗n + c]
− e(r+π̄+λ)T ∗∗n (
∫ T ∗n
T ∗∗n
e−(r+π̄+λ)t[xn,t + π̄(Vn(1, H)− k)]
+ λVn(xn,t, L)dt
+ e−(r+λ−π̄)(T
∗
n−T ∗∗n )Vn(x
∗, H))
rk =
∫ T ∗n
0
re−(r)txn,tdt+ (1− e−λT
∗
n )
∫ ∞
T ∗n
re−rtxn,tdt
+ e−(r+λ)T
∗
nx∗n − x∗n + δ(T ∗n , T ∗∗n )
rk =
r
r + λ
(1− e−(r+λ)T ∗n ) + (1− e−λT ∗n )e−(r+λ)T ∗n
+ e−(r+λ)T
∗
nx∗n − x∗n + δ(T ∗n , T ∗∗n )
rk =
r
r + λ
(1− e−(r+λ)T ∗n ) + e−(r+λ)T ∗n
− e−λT ∗n + δ(T ∗n , T ∗∗n )
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Where the second equation comes from expanding Vn(xt, L) out, and using integra-
tion by parts, and the integrals are finally evaluated by using the fact that before
time T ∗, beliefs are equal to e−λt.The term δ(T ∗n , T
∗∗
n ) collects all the terms that are
integrals from T ∗∗n to T
∗
n , and goes to 0 as T
∗
n − T ∗∗n → 0. Since there exists an N
such that for all n ≥ N δ(T ∗n , T ∗∗n ) < ε, this is a contradiction.
It remains to consider what happens if x∗∗n is 0 infinitely often. This can only happen
if
k > ∆n(0) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+λ)tdt.
Suppose the sequence (x∗∗n ) had another subsequence that was never 0. Then, by
the logic from above, in the limit of this subsequence
rk =
r
r + λ
(1− e−(r+λ)T ∗) + e−(r+λ)T ∗ − e−λT ∗ .
But, the left hand side of this is bounded above by r
r+λ
, and rk is bounded below by
r
r+λ
, so this cannot hold. Therefore, the sequence must not be non-zero infinitely
often. So x∗∗n → 0, and the proposition is satisfied.
The properties of the limit equilibrium then follow directly.
Commitment in the limit
Proof of Proposition 5
As c → 0, VBM(1, H) = VBM(1, L) = 1r > V (1, H). Let xBM,t be beliefs in the
commitment game. xBM,t ≥ xt until the first arrival (since λ ≥ π̄, and the firm
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that has committed is believed to be exerting effort everywhere), and after the first
arrival xBM,t = 1 forever, while xt still drifts down. Therefore, even with costs
added back in, the committed firm receives higher flow payoffs everywhere, and
strictly higher payoffs after the first arrival, so
VBM(x, θ) > V (x, θ) + E
(∫ ∞
0
e−rtkπtdt|x0 = x, θ0 = θ
)
.
Commitment to a Promotion Strategy
Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 12. An optimal commitment cutoff strategy exists
Proof. This will be implied by the following two lemmas
Lemma 19. Given a promotion cutoff x∗∗, there is a unique equilibrium investment
cutoff.
Proof. Consider two investment cutoffs, x∗ and x′∗, x∗∗ > x∗ > x′∗ and suppose that
both were consistant with an equilibrium. As before, let D(x, x∗, x∗∗) represent the
difference between the two value functions if the believed cutoffs are x∗ and x∗∗ and
x0 = x. If both cutoffs were consistent with equilibrium, then
D(x∗, x∗, x∗∗)−D(x∗, x′∗, x∗∗) = E
(∫ ∞
0
e−rtxt − x′tdt
)
−
∫
e−rt(xt − x′t)dt < 0.
These beliefs drift apart the same amount until the firm successfully promotes,
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afterwhich the first set of beliefs are closer together and never spread farther apart
then the beliefs conditional on no news arriving, so this difference is strictly negative.
Therefore, since, under optimal play D(x, x′∗, x∗∗) is decreasing for every law of
motion
D(x∗, x∗, x∗∗) < D(x′
∗
, x′
∗
, x∗∗),
Therefore the cutoff must be unique, the function x∗ 7→ Dx∗∗,x∗(x∗) = cλ at most
once, or is always less than c/λ. This cutoff x∗(x∗∗) is continuous in x∗∗, since
Dx∗∗,x∗(x) is continuous.
Lemma 20. x∗∗ 7→ Vc(x0, θ0) is continuous in x∗∗.
Proof. For any ε > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that if x∗∗ − x′∗∗ < δ. Let a′ and π′
denote the stratgies under the x′ law of motion.
V (x0, θ0, x
∗(x∗∗), x∗∗) ≥ E
(∫ ∞
0
e−rtxt − ca′t − kπ′t dt
)
− ε
2
≥ V (x0, θ0, x∗(x′∗∗), x′∗∗)− ε
since, by argument from the existence proof, the law of motion varies continuously
in the cutoffs, and the promotion cutoff can be made to move sufficiently small that
it only adds a ε/2 probability of an arrival, which in turn can increase the firm’s
value by at most 1.
Therefore the mapping x∗∗ 7→ Vc(x0, θ0) is continuous, the domain is a compact
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space, so a maximum exists. Therefore, an optimal promotion strategy exists.
Lemma 21. Let Vc(x, θ) be the value function for a commitment game where the
firm has committed to a promotion cutoff x∗∗c . If Vc(x, θ) > V (x, θ), then x
∗∗ > x∗∗c .
Proof. Note that in this new game, the sequential rationality condition for the
investment decision still holds.
Let x∗ and x∗∗ be cutoffs of the equilibrium that induces the highest cutoff for
investing in quality. Suppose that the firm deviates to a promotion cutoff above x∗∗.
Let Vdev denote the value function for the game with the new promotion cutoff but
the old invest/not invest cutoff where the firm has deviated to playing the strategy
prescribed by x∗c , x
∗∗
c . Then Vdev(1, H) < V (1, H) as is Vdev(x
∗, H) < V (x∗, H),
because the firm is would have been playing suboptimally in the original game,
and if beliefs follow the law of motion induced by this new cutoff, payoffs decrease
further, because the same measure over can be induced, but beliefs drift down faster.
Moreover, in this game with the new law of motion, the firm doesn’t want to invest
at any belief above x∗, since at x∗,
D(x∗) =
1
r + λ
[V (1, H)− x
∗ + π̄V (1, H)− c− kπ̄
π̄ +R
≤ c
λ
since the value at 1 must be strictly lower than the value in the original game where
the firm was indifferent between investing and not at x∗. Since D(·) is decreasing,
this implies the firm finds it optimal to not invest at any belief above x∗, and is at
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most indifferent at x∗.
In order for committing to this to be optimal, it must induce a higher level of
investment in quality. If it did not, then deviating to follow the strategy in the
new game would be a profitable deviation in the original game, since absent arrival
beliefs are weakly higher at every point, and the firm can always deviate to induce
the same measure over arrivals.
This means there must be some x∗c > x
∗ such that
Dc(x
∗
c) =
∫
e−(r+λ)tπ̄
[
Vc(1, H)−
x∗c − c+ π̄[Vc(1, H)− k]
r + π̄
]
≥ c/λ
This did not hold before beliefs updated, since in equilibrium at x∗c , D(x
∗
c) < c/λ.
But, Dc(x
∗
c) < Ddev(x
∗
c), the Ddev(x) since
Dc(x
∗
c)−Ddev(x∗c) = Vc(x∗c , H)− Vdev(x∗c , H)− [Vc(x∗c , L)− Vdev(x∗c , L)]
= E(
∫ ∞
0
e−rt[xc,t − xdev,t])−
∫
e−rt[xc,t − xdev,t] < 0
This is negative, because the two strategies induce the same measure over arrivals,
which in turn implies that if the firm starts with a high quality product Vc(x,H)−
Vdev(x,H), the beliefs must alwasy be closer together (weakly), since they are either
exactly the same distance apart independent of quality if no news arrives, and if
news arrives they are equal until they hit x∗c , in which case the low quality beliefs
have already seperated more. But, with optimal play, the value function for a firm
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with low quality doesn’t change from Vdev, while the value a firm with high quality
gets increases, so under this new law of motion Dc(x
∗
c) < Ddev(x
∗
c) ≤ D(x∗c) < cλ ,
which is a contradiction.
Lemma 22. For any initial condition, x0 = x ∈ [0, 1] \ [x∗, x∗∗), θ0 = H or
x0 = x and θ0 = L where x is a point where the firm was investing before and after
commitment, in the commitment game Vc(1, H) ≥ V (1, H).
Proof. If x0 is such that before and after the firm commits the firm is investing at
x0, then the only way the firm’s payoffs can increase is if Vc(1, H) > V (1, H). So the
initial conditions that matter are initial conditions where the firm is not investing
in the commitment game. Suppose that V (1, H) > Vc(1, H), from the previous
lemma, it must be that x∗∗ > x∗∗c . There are two cases to consider.
If x∗c > x
∗24 then
c/λ =
∫ ∞
0
π̄e−(r+λ)t[Vc(1, H)− Vc(x∗c , H)]dt
=
∫ ∞
0
π̄e−(r+λ)t[
(r + λ)
r + λ+ π̄
Vc(1, H)−
1
r + λ+ π̄
[x∗c(1 + λ/r)− kπ̄]]
<
∫ ∞
0
π̄e−(r+λ)t[
(r + λ)
r + λ+ π̄
V (1, H)− 1
r + λ+ π̄
[x∗(1 + λ/r)− kπ̄]]
=
∫ ∞
0
π̄e−(r+λ)t[V (1, H)− V (x∗, H)]dt
= c/λ,
24if x∗ = 0, then V (1,H) > Vc(1,H) implies that this condition cannot hold, so I only need to
consider the other case.
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which is a contradiction.
If x∗∗ > x∗∗c and x
∗ ≥ x∗c If θ0 = H, then Vc(1, H) can be written as
Vc(1, H) >
∫ t
0
e−
∫ s
0 (r+λ)dξ[xc,s + λVc(xs, L)]ds+ e
−
∫ t
0 (r+λ)dsVc(x0, H),
while So its only possible for Vc(1, H) is lower if Vc(xs, L) is lower for some xs.
At x∗∗c , V (x
∗∗
c , θ) > Vc(x
∗∗
c , θ) since the investment cutoff is lower and Vc(1, H) is
lower. Moreover, D(x∗∗c ) > Dc(x
∗∗
c ), because V (1, H) is larger than Vc(1, H).
D(x) > Dc(x) also holds between x
∗∗
c and x
∗∗, because one firm is promoting and
the other isn’t, and the point with this larger difference is reached faster for the
firm without commitment, so Vc(x
∗∗, L) > V (x∗∗, L), which must also hold at all
points above x∗∗, which is a contradiction.
Lemma 23. If Vc(1, H) > V (1, H), then x
∗
c ≥ x∗
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Proof. Suppose not, then25
c/λ =
∫ ∞
0
π̄e−(r+λ)t[Vc(1, H)− Vc(x∗c , H)]dt
=
∫ ∞
0
π̄e−(r+λ)t[
(r + λ)
r + λ+ π̄
Vc(1, H)−
1
r + λ+ π̄
(x∗c(1 + λ/r)− kπ̄)]
>
∫ ∞
0
π̄e−(r+λ)t[
(r + λ)
r + λ+ π̄
V (1, H)− 1
r + λ+ π̄
(x∗(1 + λ/r)− kπ̄)]
=
∫ ∞
0
π̄e−(r+λ)t[V (1, H)− V (x∗, H)]dt
= c/λ,
This is a contradiction, so x∗c ≥ x∗.
Properties of Equilibrium
Proof of Lemma 4
As in the good news case, the value functions can be rewritten as
V (x, θ) =
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 (r+λ+π̄−πs)ds[xt − (π̄ − πt)1θ=L(∆(xt)) + λatD(xt) + λ(V (xt, L)
− V (xt, θ))− kπt − cat]ds,
which directly gives the sequential rationality conditions. The monotonicity condi-
tions follow from the same logic as in the good news case.
25If x∗ = 0 (which x∗c = 0 implies), then this holds vacuously, so I am considering the other
case.
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Moreover,
D(x) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+λ)t(kπt + (π̄ − πt)∆(xt))dt,
which can be seen by taking the difference of the above expression for V (x, θ).
Existence and Uniqueness
Proof of Proposition 6 and 10:
By the sequential rationality condition, D(x) is bounded above by
D(x) ≤ kπ̄
r + λ
,
so if c > λ
r+λ
kπ̄, then the firm never invests.
Case 1: c > λ
r+λ
kπ̄.
Now it can never be optimal for the firm to exert effort. It is thus sufficient to
find the cutoff where the firm prefers to stop censoring, because for any beliefs
the optimal choice of this cutoff will automatically preclude any effort exerted by
the firm. Consider the modified problem where xt follows law of motion ẋt =
−λxt + π̄xt(1 − xt) if this is negative and ẋt = 0 otherwise and the firm never
censors. Denote the value function for this problem as Vnc. Then the solution to
max
x∗∗
∫ x∗∗
0
(Vnc(x, L)− k)dx.
exists, and Vnc(x, L) ≥ V (x, L) for all beliefs below x∗∗, and Vnc(x∗∗, L) = V (x∗∗).
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Vnc(·, L) is continuous, so V (x∗∗, L) ≥ k above x∗∗ (or x∗∗ = 1) and since V (x, L) is
increasing in x, this holds for all x > x∗∗ so this is sequentially rational. Moreover,
since Vnc is monotonically increasing, this cutoff is unique. This implies uniqueness
of the equilibrium. The uniqueness of proposition 10 follows from exactly the same
logic where the modified law of motion is ẋt = −λxt + µxt(1− xt).
Case 2: c ≤ λ
r+λ
kπ̄.
There always exists an equilibrium where the firm stops censoring at a higher belief
than when it stops working. Consider the following problem.
max
x∗∗
∫ 1
x∗∗
π̄(Vwc(x, L)− k)dx.
where Vwc is the value function corresponding to the problem where the firm is
working and censoring everywhere except at 0 where it is doing nothing and is
believed to be doing that. This is well defined, strictly increasing, and continuous
except at 0. This maximization problem has a solution, x∗∗.
Define Dx∗(x
∗+) = limε→0D
x∗(x∗ + ε) and Dx∗(x
∗−) = limε→0Dx
∗
(x∗ − ε). As
shown in Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013), function Dx∗(x
∗±) satisfies
1. Dx∗(x
∗+) is continuous and strictly increasing on [0, x∗∗) and limx∗→x∗∗ Dx∗(x
∗+) =
limx∗→x∗∗ D0(x
∗+).
2. limx∗→x∗∗ Dx∗(x
∗−) = limx∗→x∗∗ Dx∗∗(x∗∗−), and if λ ≥ π̄ then Dx∗(x∗−) is
continuous and strictly increasing with limx∗→0D
x∗(x∗−) = 0.
124
3. At any cutoff x∗, if beliefs are drifting up above x∗ and down below x∗, then
Dx∗(x
∗+) > Dx∗(x
∗−).
Property 1 follows from the following observation. When the firm is believed to
be working and not censoring, beliefs are drifting up, and never drop below x∗
unless news arrives and they go to 0. So Dx∗(x) is the same as D0(x), the difference
between the value of a high and low quality product of a firm who works everywhere
but at x = 0, for all x∗∗ > x > x∗. So Dx∗(x
∗+) = D0(x
∗+), and D0(x) is strictly
increasing and continuous by the previous lemma, and Dx∗(x
∗∗+) = D0(x
∗∗+).
Property 2 follows from the same logic as property 1. For any cutoff x∗∗ > x∗ ≥
max(1−λ/π̄, 0), beliefs always stay below x∗ once they start below x∗, so the firm’s
payoffs are the same as the payoffs they’d receive if they started shirking at x∗∗, and
since Dx∗∗(x) is continuous and increasing below x
∗∗ and above max(1−λ/π̄, 0), so
is Dx∗(x
∗−).
Property 3 follows directly from the monotonicity of Dx∗(x). Since this is increas-
ing, it must always be that Dx∗(x
∗+) ≥ Dx∗(x∗−) with this holding strictly at a
divergent cutoff, where the function must be discontinuous.
A cutoff x∗ is consistent with an equilibrium if Dx∗(x
∗−) ≤ c/λ ≤ Dx∗(x∗+) or if
D0(0+) ≥ c/λ. The continuity and monotonicity of Dx∗(x∗+) implies that an x∗
exists that satisfies the sequential rationality condition, since Dx∗(x
∗+) must either
cross c or always lie above or below c on [0, x∗∗), and above x∗∗, for any cutoff
x∗ ∈ [0, x∗∗) it must be that Dx∗(x) = 1r+λkπ̄ > c/λ, so, the firm always wants to
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work there.
Finally, since the drift above x∗∗ is positive xt never drops below x
∗∗ once it has
gone above it, so V (x∗∗, L) = Vwc(x
∗∗, L), where V is the value function when the
firm is playing x∗∗ and x∗ as cutoffs, so x∗∗ is still sequentially rational.
In the case of proposition 10, the above logic holds. The only exception being
that
D(x) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+λ)t(kπt + (π̄ − πt)∆(xt))dt
≤
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+λ)tkπ̄ + ε∆(xt)
≤ kπ̄ + ε
r + λ
.
The firm never invests if c > λ
r+λ
(kπ̄ + ε). The existence argument from Case 1
holds in this case, and the argument from Case 2 holds when c < λ
r+λ
(kπ̄ + ε).
Uniqueness of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 8 This proof proceeds in two steps. First, I show that the
firm never conditions on their private history, and then argue that this implies that
any PBE is the MPE, up to what happens at the point where the firm is indifferent.
Lemma 24. For any two private histories, ht and h
′
t, it is optimal to play a(ht) =
a(h′t) if x(ht) = x(h
′
t) and π(ht) = π(h
′
t) if x(ht) = x(h
′
t) and θ(ht) = θ(h
′
t),
where x(·) is the current reputation after history h and θ is the current quality after
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history h, and a(·) and π(·) are the continuation strategies (the entire stochastic
process from time t forward).
Proof. Consider any two histories with the same reputation and quality at times
t. Suppose that (a(ht), π(ht)) gave a higher payoff than (a(h
′
t), π(h
′
t)). Then the
firm with history h′t could deviate to the strategy (a(ht), π(ht)) and receive a higher
payoff, since this would induce the same measure over public history, which in
turn would induce the same payoffs. So after any two histories that induce the
same reputation and type, the firm’s strategies can only be different if they are
indifferent.
Continuation values can thus be written as a function of the public history and the
firm’s private type at the current instant. A strategy a is sequentially rational at a
public history ht if it maximizes
λD(ht)at − cat,
where D(ht) = V (ht, H)− V (ht, L), and similarly π maximizes
π(∆(ht)− k).
The expression, D(hT ) can be rewritten as
D(ht) =
∫
e−(r+λ)[(π̄ − πt)∆(h∅s) + kπt] dt.
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where h∅s is the public history following time t where no bad news has arrived by
time s. Since, k is πt is minimizing the integrand,
D(ht) ≤
1
r + λ
kπ̄,
which implies that investment is never sequentially rational. If λ ≥ π̄ this directly
implies that the MPE is unique, since beliefs must drift down everywhere, so this
is markovian.
Otherwise there could be an equilibrium where beliefs oscillate, the firm censors, let
beliefs drifts down, and then stops and lets beliefs drift up, or an equilibria where
beliefs always drift in the same direction, but the drift is constant for a while and
then starts drifting again.
Lemma 25. Fix a time t. If no news has arrived by time t, and beliefs are monotone
in t until news arrives, then continuation values are also monotone in time.
Proof. Let Vt+s,θ be the continuation value at time t + s when the firm’s current
quality is θ. From the previous lemma, the current calender time and the current
quality pin down continuation payoffs. Suppose xt+s is increasing in s (the argument
if it is decreasing is analogous). Then, for any s, s′, s > s′, the Vt+s,θ ≥ Vt+s′,θ, since
beliefs (weakly) higher at every future time xt+s+v ≥ xt+s′+v for any v > 0, so the
firm could mimic the strategy they would play starting at s′ and receive exactly the
same measure over quality shocks and news. Moreover, the firm’s flow payoff would
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be weakly higher at every point. Therefore the firm’s continuation payoffs must be
higher.
Lemma 26. If π̄ > λ then along any trajectory the drift of beliefs can never change
directions.
Proof. The case where beliefs drift for a while, stop, and then start drifting again
in the same direction is impossible, because at the constant point, the agent would
have to be indifferent between censoring and not and the value functions would be
monotone because the drift of beliefs does not change sign, which in turn implies
that it would never be sequentially rational to take an action that makes beliefs
start drifting again after they are constant. What remains is to rule out is cases
where the drift changes direction.
Suppose that belief’s oscillate, or the drift switches directions. First, suppose that
the drift just switches directions once, from down to up (the argument when they
switch from up to down is analogous). Then let t be a time such that beliefs are
drifting up at time t and there exists a t′ < t such that xt = xt′ and beliefs are
drifting down at t′. Then, the firm must be censoring at t′ and not censoring at t.
But, since the drift never switches sign after time t, it must be that xt+s > xt′+s for
any s > 0, which implies that k ≥ ∆t > ∆t′ ≥ k, which is a contradiction.
It remains to rule out oscillations. Suppose beliefs drift down, then up, then down
again (the argument for up, down, up is analogous). Then we can find a time t
where beliefs are drifting down at xt, t < t
′ where beliefs are drifting up at xt′ ,
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xt = xt′ and the drift only switches signs once between t and t
′. Let s be the time
such that t′ + s is the time when the drift switches signs again. We can always find t
and t′ such that beliefs are drifting up at t+s. Then for any 0 < u < s, xt+u < xt′+u,
and the firm must not be censoring at time t+ s. So Vt+s(L) < Vt′+s(L). Since this
is true and xt+u > xt′+u at every point, the firm’s payoff must be strictly higher at
t′, but the firm is censoring at t and not at t′ so k ≥ ∆t′ > ∆t ≥ k.
Therefore, in all equilibria, beliefs are either drifting in one direction or are con-
stant until an arrival happens. The only way for beliefs to be constant is if the
firm is indifferent between censoring and not. This implies there exists Markovian
strategies that induce this law of motion for beliefs, and only differ from the perfect
Bayesian strategies at indifference points, so these strategies also induce the same
payoffs. Since the Markov perfect equilibrium is unique, these must be the Markov
strategies from proposition 7.
Commitment
Proof of Corollary 3 Consider a sequence rn → 0. In this sequence of equilibrium
lim
n→∞
rn(Vn(x, θ) + E(
∫
e−rntkπt dt)) = lim
n→∞
E
(
rn
∫ ∞
0
e−rntxt dt
)
= 0,
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since
rn
∫ ∞
0
erntxt dt = rn[
∫ T
0
e−rntxt dt+
∫ ∞
T
e−(rn+µ)txt dt],
= rn[
∫ T
0
xe−(rn+λ)t dt +
∫ ∞
T
e−(rn+µ)txt dt]
= 0
where T is the time it takes to reach the region where the firm doesn’t censor.
On the other hand, if the firm has committed to not censor, for any x where
x > min(λ
π̄
− 1, lim sup x∗c,n), there exists an N such that for any n ≥ N , beliefs are
drifting up in all equilibria in the sequence at that point. Finally
rnVn(x,H) = rn
∫
e−rnt[xt − c]dt > 0.
and
rnVn(x, L) = rn
∫
e−(rn+λ)t[xt − c+ λVn(x,H)]dt ≥
λ
rn + λ
(rnVn(x
∗
c,n, H)) > 0,
so the firm always benefits from commitment.
Exogenous Good News
Proof of Proposition 9
The argument from lemma 2 and lemma 1 are identical in this environment.
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So D(x) is decreasing and ∆(x) is decreasing. This implies that any MPE can be
characterized by two cutoffs. If λ ≥ µ, then x∗ is an absorbing cutoff. Once beliefs
reach x∗, they stay there until news arrives. This implies that, in any MPE
D(x∗) =
∫
e−(r+λ)t[(µ)∆(x∗) + πt(∆(x
∗)− k)]dt.
Case 1:
(
1 + r
λ
)
c ≥ kµ and λ ≥ µ. Suppose that x∗ > x∗∗. Then:
c
λ
≥ D(x∗) = 1
r + λ
µ∆(x∗) <
kµ
r + λ
,
since the firm does not find promotion to be optimal at this point. But, this
contradicts the assumption that
(
1 + r
λ
)
c ≥ kµ, so this cannot be an equilibrium.
Case 2:
(
1 + r
λ
)
c < kµ and λ ≥ µ. Suppose that x∗∗ ≥ x∗ > 0. Then
c/λ ≥ D(x∗) ≥ D(x∗∗) ≥
∫
e−(r+λ)µ∆(x∗∗) dt ≥ µk
r + λ
.
if x∗∗ > 0, which is a contradiction. If x∗ = 0, then by similar logic, k ≥ ∆(0), so
x∗∗ = 0.
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4 Appendix: Bounded Rationality and Learning
4.1 Appendix
4.1.1 Posterior Representation.
Let Z be a signal space. Suppose signals {zn} are i.i.d., conditional on the state, and
drawn according to probability measure µω ∈ ∆(Z) in state ω ∈ {L,R}. Assume
µL, µR are mutually absolutely continuous. Define the posterior belief s(z) ≡ 1/(1+
dµR
dµL
(z)) that the state is L. The c.d.f. F ωs (x) ≡ µω(z|s(z) ≤ x) is the distribution
of the posterior belief s, with common support suppFs.
Suppose an agent has a misspecified belief µ̂ω ∈ ∆(Z) about the probabil-
ity measure over signals, where µ̂L, µ̂R are mutually absolutely continuous and
supp µ̂ ⊂ suppµ. When the agent observes signal z, she has misspecified posterior
belief ŝ(z) ≡ 1/(1 + dµ̂R
dµ̂L
(z)). The c.d.f. F̂ ωŝ (x) ≡ µ̂ω(z|ŝ(z) ≤ x) is the perceived
distribution of the perceived posterior belief ŝ. We also define the c.d.f. F ωŝ (x) ≡
µω(z|ŝ(z) ≤ x) as the true distribution of ŝ and the c.d.f. F̂ ωs (x) ≡ µ̂ω(z|s(z) ≤ x)
as the perceived distribution of s.
We define two properties of measures. The first describes a property of the
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relationship between a pair of true measures and a pair of misspecified measures.
Definition 13 (Ordinal Ranking of Signals). Given mutually absolutely continuous
true measures µL, µR ∈ ∆(Z), the mutually absolutely continuous misspecified
measures µ̂L, µ̂R ∈ ∆(Z) strictly preserve the ordinal ranking of signals if for any
z, z′ ∈ Z such that s(z) ≥ s(z′), then ŝ(z) ≥ ŝ(z′), with equality iff s(z) = s(z′).
The second describes an equivalence class of measures, which lead to the same
support of posterior beliefs and distributions over posterior beliefs.
Definition 14 (Equivalent Measures). Mutually absolutely continuous measures
µL, µR ∈ ∆(Z) and νL, νR ∈ ∆(Z) are equivalent iff suppµ = supp ν and µω(z|1/(1+
dµR
dµL
(z)) ≤ x) = νω(z|1/(1 + dνR
dνL
(z)) ≤ x) for all x ∈ [0, 1].
The following Lemma establishes that when a pair of misspecified measures
preserve the ordinal ranking of signals, it is equivalent to view misspecification
in terms of the underlying measures (µ̂L, µ̂R) on Z and the pair (r, F̂Ls ), where
r : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a strictly increasing function mapping the true posterior s to
the misspecified posterior belief ŝ and c.d.f. F̂Ls is the perceived distribution of the
true posterior s in state L.
Lemma 27. Let µL, µR ∈ ∆(Z) be a set of mutually absolutely continuous measures
on Z, with common support suppµ.
1. For any mutually absolutely continuous misspecified measures µ̂L, µ̂R ∈ ∆(Z)
that strictly preserve the ordinal ranking of signals and have common support
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supp µ̂ ⊂ suppµ, there exists a unique (r, F̂Ls ), where r : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a
strictly increasing function on suppFs, such that ŝ(z) = r(s(z)) for all z ∈ Z
and F̂Ls is the c.d.f. of the perceived distribution of s in state L.
2. For any function r : [0, 1] → [0, 1] that is strictly increasing on suppFs and
c.d.f. of posterior beliefs F̂Ls with supp F̂
L
s ⊆ suppFs, there exists a unique
(up to an equivalent measure) pair of mutually absolutely continuous mea-
sures26 µ̂L, µ̂R ∈ ∆(Z) that have common support supp µ̂ ⊂ suppµ, strictly
preserve the ordinal ranking of signals, and satisfy r(s(z)) = 1/(1 + dµ̂
R
dµ̂L
(z))
for all z ∈ Z.
Proof. First establish part (i). Let µ̂L, µ̂R ∈ ∆(Z) be measures that are mutually
absolutely continuous with common support supp µ̂ ⊂ suppµ and strictly preserve
the ordinal ranking of signals. Define the mapping r : supp(Fs) → [0, 1] as r(s(z)) =
ŝ(z). This is a function since if s(z) = s(z′), then ŝ(z) = ŝ(z′), which establishes
existence. For any z such that s(z) > s(z′), ŝ(z) = r(s(z)) > ŝ(z′) = r(s(z′))
since µ̂L, µ̂R strictly preserve the ordinal ranking of signals. Therefore, r is strictly
increasing on suppFs. Define F̂
L
s (x) ≡ µ̂L(z|s(z) ≤ x). Then F̂Ls is the perceived
distribution of s under measure µ̂L.
Next, show part (ii). Let r : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be a strictly increasing function on
suppFs and let c.d.f. F̂
L
s be the perceived distribution of s in state L. Then, from
Lemma A.1 in Smith and Sorensen (2000), the perceived distribution of s in state
26Note: µ̂R need not be a probability measure.
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R is uniquely determined by
F̂Rs (x) =
∫ x
0
1− r(p)
r(p)
dF̂Ls (p).
Since F̂Rs has Radon-Nikodym derivative
1−r(p)
r(p)
, it induces posterior belief r(p) after
observing a signal z from set of signals Z = {z|s(z) = p} that lead to correctly
specified posterior p, for any p ∈ supp F̂Ls (p). If any other distribution induced the
same posterior beliefs, then it would also have Radon-Nikodym derivative 1−r(p)
r(p)
, so
it would be equivalent to F̂Rs .
Define the random variable S = s(z). F̂ ωs defines a probability measure over
this random variable. For any measurable set A ⊆ Z, define
µ̂ω(A) =
∫
E(1A|S)dF̂ ωs ,
where E is the conditional expectation defined with respect to µL. The distributions
µ̂R and µ̂L are mutually absolutely continuous by definition and supp µ̂ ⊆ suppµ.
Moveover, since F ωs is unique, µ̂
ω is unique up to the probability measure that is
used to evaluate E(·|S). For any measurable set A ⊆ Z,
µ̂R(A) =
∫
E(1A|S)
(
1− r(S)
r(S)
)
dF̂Ls =
∫ (
1z∈A
1− r(s(z))
r(s(z))
)
dµ̂L,
where the second equality follows from the definition of µ̂L, so these distributions
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induce the correct posterior beliefs.
Under one additional assumption, any rθ is induced by at least one misspecified
model, the model in which the misspecified type interprets a signal z like a correctly
specified type would interpret a signal s−1(ŝ(z)).
Lemma 28. Suppose r : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a strictly increasing function on suppFs
and r(suppF ) ⊆ suppF .27 Then there exists probability measures µ̂L, µ̂R such that
the perceived posterior distribution satisfies F̂ ωŝ (ŝ) = F
ω
s (s).
Proof. Let F̂Ls (s) ≡ FLs (r(s)). This satisfies FL(s) = F̂Lŝ (s), it remains to show
that F̂R also satisfies this identity.
By Lemma A.1 in Smith and Sorensen (2000)
FRs (r(s)) =
∫ r(s)
0
1− p
p
dFLs (p), (4.1.1)
and it must be that
F̂Rs (s) =
∫ s
0
1− r(q)
r(q)
dF̂Ls (q).
Applying the change of variables formula to formula 4.1.1
F̂Rs (s) =
∫ s
0
1− r(q)
r(q)
dF̂Ls (q).
27If this assumption does not hold, for instance, in the case of bounded signals and r(s) = sν ,
a slight extension to this model to allow type θ to encode (µ̂θ, π̂θ, µθ) where µθ is the distribution
type θ’s signals were actually drawn from, and µ̂ is the distribution they use to update.
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So F̂ ωs (s) = F
ω
s (r(s)) in both states.
4.1.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Throughout this section, assume Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold and suppose ω = R.
Proof of Lemma 5. At a stationary vector λ∗, ϕi(a, σ,λ
∗) = λ∗ for all (a, σ)
such that ψi(a, σ|ω,λ∗) > 0. When π(ΘA) > 0, both actions occur with positive
probability at all λ ∈ [0, 1]k, since autarkic types play both actions with posi-
tive probability independent of the history. Both public signals always occur with
positive probability since the distribution is independent of λ. Therefore, at all
λ ∈ [0, 1]k, either ψi(L, σL|ω,λ) > 0 or ψi(R, σR|ω,λ) > 0 (or both). By Assump-
tion 2, actions and/or public signals are perceived to be informative by all sociable
types θi, so at all λ ∈ [0,∞]k,
ψ̂i(L, σL|L,λ)
ψ̂i(L, σL|R,λ)
> 1 and
ψ̂i(R, σR|L,λ)
ψ̂i(R, σR|R,λ)
< 1.
Therefore, ϕ(a, σ,λ) = λ at all (a, σ) such that ψi(a, σ|ω,λ) > 0 if and only if
λ ∈ {0,∞}k. 2
Proof of Lemma 6.
Part 1. Consider the stationary vector 0. Since γi(0) < 0 for all i, there exists
a neighborhood of 0, [0,M ]k, such given any likelihood ratio vector λa,σ ∈ [0,M ]k
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for each a, σ pair
∑
a,σ
ψi(a, σ|R,0) log
ψ̂i(a, σ|L,λa,σ)
ψ̂i(a, σ|R,λa,σ)
< 0.
Let
gi,a,σ = sup
λ∈[0,M ]k
log
ψ̂i(a, σ|L,λa,σ)
ψ̂i(a, σ|R,λa,σ)
and let
ḡi = max
a,σ
gi,a,σ.
Fix an ε > 0 and define a neighborhood [0,Mε]
k ⊆ [0,M ]k such that
| inf
λ∈[0,Mε]k
ψ(a, σ,λ)− ψ(a, σ, 0)| < ε/4.
Define the linear system ⟨λ̂ε,t⟩ as follows.
λ̂ε,t = exp(ga,σ)λ̂t−1,
when public signal σ is realized and the type drawn in period t would play a for all
λ ∈ [0,Mε], and
λ̂ε,t = exp(ḡi)λ̂t−1
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otherwise (let ε̄ be the probability of this event). This is a linear system in each
coordinate, so by lemma C.1 of Smith and Sorensen (2000) if
exp(ḡi)
ε̄
∏
a,σ
exp(gi,a,σ)
inf
λ∈[0,Mε]k
ψi(a,σ|R,λ) < 1.
This holds for sufficiently small ε, ε1, since this is strictly less than 1 at ε = 0.
So whenever a private signal is drawn such that a type would play a for any
λ ∈ [0,Mε]k, λ̂ε1,t updates by exp(ga,σ) which is by construction larger than the
actual update. Otherwise, λt updates by ḡ, which is larger than all possible updates.
Therefore λ̂i,ε1,t−1 = λi,t−1 then λ̂i,ε1,t ≥ λi,t for all i. So if λ0 ∈ [0,Mε1 ]k then it
is bounded above by a RV that converges almost surely as long as it remains in
[0,Mε1 ]
k.
Since λ̂ε1,t → 0 almost surely
Pr(∪t ∩s≥t {λ̂s ∈ [0,Mε1 ]k}) = 1
So there must exist some t ≥ 0 such that Pr(∀s ≥ t, λ̂ε1,s ∈ [0,Mε1 ]k and since the
system is linear, if this holds at some t > 0, it must hold at t = 0. So, with positive
probability, if λ̂ε1,0 ∈ [0,Mε1 ]k, it remains in [0,Mε1 ]k forever and is thus always
larger than λ. When this happens, since λ̂ε1 converges to 0, so does λ.
The proof in the other cases is analogous. If λ∗i = ∞, consider the λ−1i instead
for that component and modify the transition rules accordingly. 2
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Part 2. Suppose λ∗ is stationary and there exists a θi ∈ ΘS such that λi = 0
and γi(λ
∗) > 0 or λi = ∞ and γi(λ∗) < 0. Suppose P (λt → λ∗) > 0 so that the
likelihood ratio converges to this vector with positive probability. Let
ΘR ≡ {θi ∈ ΘS|λi = 0}
be the set of sociable types with limit belief 0 and ΘL ≡ ΘS \ ΘR be the set of
sociable types with limit belief ∞. Given θi ∈ ΘS, define
gi(a, σ,λ) ≡ log
ψ̂i(a, σ|L,λ)
ψ̂i(a, σ|R,λ)
.
for all i ∈ ΘR and
gi(a, σ,λ) ≡ log
ψ̂i(a, σ|R,λ)
ψ̂i(a, σ|L,λ)
for all other types. The log-likelihood ratio process ⟨logλt⟩ follows law of motion
log λi,t+1 = log λi,t + gi(at, σt,λt) for each θi ∈ ΘS. Fix a nbhd [0,M ]k and define
an i.i.d. sequence of random variables
αθt =

L if θt plays L at (λt, st) for any λ ∈ [0,M ]
R if θt plays R at (λt, st) for any λ ∈ [0,M ]
R if the above doesn’t hold and θ ∈ ΘR
L otherwise
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Fix ε > 0, and choose M such that the probability that either of the first two cases
do not occur is at most ε.
By Lemma 6, for small ε > 0
∑
α,σ
ψi,α(L, σ,λ
∗)gi(α, σ,λ
∗) > (<)0.
for all θi ∈ ΘR(ΘL), where ψα(α, σ,λ∗) is the probability of (α, σ) given the αθ
random variable.
By continuity, there exists an M̄ > 0 such that
∑
α,σ
ψi,α(L, σ,λ
∗)gi(α, σ,λα,σ) > (<)0.
inequalities holds for any four λα,σ ∈ [0, M̄ ]k, for any θi ∈ ΘR(ΘL)
Let
gi,a,σ = inf
λ∈[0,M̄ ]k
gi(a, σ,λ).
By construction ∑
α,σ
ψα,i(α, σ|R,λ)gi,a,σ > 0.
In a neighborhood of the non-locally stable vector λ,
∑
gi(at, σt,λ) ≥
∑
gi,αit,σt .
Since ⟨αt⟩ and ⟨σt⟩ are i.i.d. processes,
lim
T→∞
P
(
1
T
T∑
t=0
gi,αit,σt > 0
)
= 1
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by the Strong Law of Large Numbers. Let τ1 be the first time beliefs enter the set
[0,M ]k and never leave for type θi. This implies that
λi,t = λi,τ1 +
t−1∑
i=τ1
gi(αt, σt, 0) → ∞ a.s.,
which is a contradiction. 2
The following Lemma is an intermediate result used in Lemma 7.
Lemma 29. For any logλ ∈ Rk, inf g(L, σL,λ) > 0 and sup g(R, σR,λ) < 0.
Proof. L actions are always perceived to occur (weakly) more frequently in state L
and R actions are always perceived to occur more frequently in state R. Similarly,
σR signals are always perceived to occur more frequently in state R and σL signals
are perceived to occur more frequently in σL. Under Assumption 2, agents either
believe there is a positive mass of autarkic types or the public signal is informative.
Suppose type θi believes there is a positive mass of autarkic types. Following an L
action, log λi updates to
log
Pr(L|θ ∈ ΘA, ω = L)π̂i(ΘA) + π̂i(ΘS)Pr(L|θ ̸∈ ΘA, ω = L)
Pr(L|θ ∈ ΘA, ω = R)π̂i(ΘA) + π̂i(ΘA)Pr(L|θ ̸∈ ΘA, ω = R)
where Pr is the misperceived probability. This is bounded below by
log
Pr(L|θ ∈ ΘA, ω = L)π̂i(ΘA)
Pr(L|θ ∈ ΘA, ω = R)π̂i(ΘA) + π̂i(ΘS)1
> 0.
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Similar logic holds for R actions.
Suppose type θi believes that the public signal is informative. Then the minimal
informativeness of σL is always positive, so the log-likelihood ratio updates are
bounded below uniformly.
Proof of Lemma 7. Suppose 0 ∈ ΛL. Let J denote the locally stable neigh-
borhood defined in Lemma 6 and choose M > 0 so that if logλ ∈ Rk \ [−M,M ]k
then it is contained in one of the neighborhoods of stationary points constructed in
Lemma 6. Let N be the minimal number of consecutive (R, σR) action and signal
pairs required for the likelihood ratio of all sociable types to reach J , given initial
likelihood ratio logλ0 ∈ [−M,M ]k. N exists by Lemma 29.
Let τ3 be the first time that λi enters J for all θi ∈ ΘS, and let τ4 be the first
time any type’s beliefs leave after entering. We know that P (τ3 < ∞) = 1, since if
they did not, logλ ∈ [−M,M ]k infinitely often, and the probability of transitioning
from [−M,M ]k to J is bounded below by the probability of observing N action
and signal pairs (R, σR).
Also, P (τ4 < ∞) < 1, since beliefs enter J and never leave with positive
probability due to local stability. So P (λt ̸∈ J i.o.) = 0. Let τ5 be the first time
the likelihood ratio enters the J set and stays there forever. P (τ5 < ∞) = 1, so
the likelihood ratio remains in the J almost surely. By Lemma 6, if the likelihood
ratio remains in J forever, then beliefs must converge. 2
Let J be the neighborhood constructed in Lemma 6 and letM > 0 be such that
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if λ ∈ R \ [−M,M ] then it is contained in one of the neighborhoods constructed in
lemma 6 (either the neighborhood where beliefs converge with positive probability
or the nbhd where beliefs leave with probability 1).
Proof of Lemma 8. Let k = 2 and first suppose signals are bounded. The linear
equation
A(0, 0)
c
d
 =
0
1

has a solution where (c, d) are positive if and only if det(A(0, 0)) > 0. Therefore, if
det(A(0, 0)) > 0 then there exist c, d such that
c log
ψ̂i(L|0, L)
ψ̂i(L|0, R)
+ d log
ψ̂i(R|0, L)
ψ̂i(R|0, R)
is negative for θ1 and positive for θ2. Moreover, for some −M ′ < −M if logλ ∈
(−∞,−M ′]k of 0, this will still hold.
Let
ξ1,t =
∑
g1,at,σt
where g1,a,σ = suplogλ∈(−∞,−M ′]2 g1(a, σ,λ) and
ξ2,t =
∑
g2,at,σt
where g2,at,σt = infλ∈(−∞,−M ′′]2 g2(a, σ,λ).
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For any K2 > 0 there exists a sequence of actions (at, σt)
T
t=1 and a finite number
K1, where T is some finite number such that
1. ξ1,T < 0
2. ξ2,T > K2
3. ξ1,t < K1 for all t.
This sequence exists because there are rational numbers P and Q such that
P log
(
ψ̂i(L|L,λ)
ψ̂i(L|R,λ)
)
+ Q log
(
ψ̂i(R|L,λ)
ψ̂i(R|R,λ)
)
is less than 0 for the first type and is greater
than 0 for the second. So there exists a non-zero N ∈ N such that NP and NQ are
integers. Then after NP (L, σL)
′s and NQ (R, σR)’s, λ1 decreases and λ2 increases.
So a finite sequence of actions that satisfies the three properties exists.
Let λ0 ∈ (−∞,−M ]2. As long as logλ ∈ (−∞,−M ′]2, ξ1 bounds the updates
to θ1’s beliefs above, logλ1,t − logλ1,0 < ξ1,t, and ξ2 bounds θ2’s beliefs below
logλ2,t − logλ2,0 > ξ2,t.
Let (−∞,−M ′] be the set of log-likelihood ratios constructed in lemma 6 around
λ∗ = 0k. The above construction implies that for K2 = 1 if log λ1 < −M ′−K1−K
for any K > 0 where K1 is the K1 that corresponds to K2 = 1, then there exists
a sequence of actions such that λ1 < −M ′ − K and λ2 is outside of (−∞,M ′] if
λ1 ∈ (−∞,−M ′].
Let N1 be the smallest number of consecutive (L, σL) actions and signals it
takes for λ2,t to go from a point outside of (−∞,−M ′] to [M,∞). This can at most
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increase log λ1,t by K < ∞ by lemma 29. So, if log λ1,t < sup−M ′ −K −K1 for
large enough K1, then there exists a finite sequence of S actions such that
1. log λ1,t < −M ′ for all t.
2. log λ2,S > M .
Since any finite sequence of actions occurs with positive probability, and beliefs
converge with positive probability once the logλ enters (−∞,−M ′]×[M,∞), beliefs
converge with positive probability to λ∗ = (0,∞) if this is true.
So, with positive probability, from any initial λ0 ∈ (0,∞)2, λ enters a neighbor-
hood of (0,∞) where beliefs converge with positive probability. So, disagreement
occurs with positive probability. 2
Proof of Lemma 9. By Lemma 8, we can separate θi∗ and θj∗ , since
A(λ(i∗,j∗)) =
gi∗(L, σL,λ) gi∗(R, σR,λ)
gj∗(L, σL,λ) gj∗(R, σR,λ)

has positive determinant by the assumption that θi∗ ≻λ θj∗ . As in the proof of
Lemma 8, let
ξi,t ≡
∑
gi,at,σt
where gj,at,σt ≡ inf logλ∈(−∞,−M ′]k gj(a, σ,λ) for all j > m, and let
gi,at,σt ≡ suplog λ∈(−∞,−M ′]k gi(a, σ,λ) for all other i ≤ m.
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By the argument from Lemma 8, for any Kj∗ ∈ R+, there exists a sequence of
actions, a T ∈ N, and a Ki∗ ∈ R+ such that
ξi∗,T < 0
ξj∗,T > Kj∗
ξi∗,t < Ki∗ for all t ≤ T
Moreover, the ≽ relation implies that for any θi ≽ θj, the log likelihood ratio for θi
has increased more (or decreased less) than the log likelihood ratio for θj as long as
both likelihood ratios remain in (−∞,−M ′]. Therefore, there exists a sequence of
actions such that λi ∈ (∞,−M ′ −K] for all types θi where i ≤ m for any K > 0
and λj ̸∈ −(∞,−M ′] for all other types j.
Let N1 be the minimum number of consecutive (L, σL) actions and signals such
that for any type j > m such that if logλj,t = −M ′ then logλj,t+N1 > M (denote
this by J jD for each type θj). This minimum number of (L, σL) actions exists by
Lemma 29.
There exists a maximum amount that these N1 (L, σL)s can increase log λj for
any j ≤ m. Let K be the maximum amount that this can increase log λj for any
j ≤ m (i.e. after N1 (L, σL)s, log λj,N1 − log λj,0 < K for any λ0).
Therefore, from any initial λ0, there exists a sequence such that λj ∈ (−∞,−M ′−
K] for all types i ≤ m and λi /∈ (−∞,−M ′] for all other types. With positive proba-
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bility, N1 consecutive (L, σL)s occur after the likelihood ratio reaches this set. After
N1 consecutive (L, σL)s logλ ∈ (−∞,−M ]m × [M,∞)k−m. Therefore λ enters a
neighborhood of (0m,∞k−m) where beliefs converge with positive probability. So,
disagreement occurs with positive probability. 2
Proof of Lemma 10. Let J be the neighborhood constructed in Lemma 6 and
let M > 0 be such that if λ ∈ R \ [−M,M ] then it is contained in one of the neigh-
borhoods constructed in lemma 6 (either the neighborhood where beliefs converge
with positive probability or the nbhd where beliefs leave with probability 1). Let
τ1 = inf{t : λt ∈ J }.
First, we show that Pr(τ1 < ∞) = 1. Suppose Pr(τ1 < ∞) < 1. If 0 or ∞ are
stable, then there exists a sequence of actions such that for any point in logλ0 ∈
[−M,M ]k enters J . By the proof of Lemma 9 for any disagreement point there
exists a finite sequence of actions such that from any point in logλ0 ∈ [−M,M ]k
beliefs eventually enter J . Therefore, the probability of entering J from any point
in [−M,M ]k in finite time is bounded away from 0. Moreover, conditional on
beliefs never entering J , then with probability 1 logλt ∈ [−M,M ]k i.o. Since the
probability of entering J from [−M,M ]k is bounded away from 0, beliefs must
eventually enter J . Therefore, Pr(τ1 < ∞) = 1. Let τ2 = inf{t > τ1 : λt ̸∈ J }.
By Lemma 6, Pr(τ2 <∞) < 1. Therefore, Pr(λt ̸∈ J i.o.) = 0, so beliefs converge
almost surely. 2
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Proof of Lemma 11. Suppose beliefs converged to a non-stationary point λ∗ ∈
(0,∞)k with positive probability. After an L action and a σL public signal, the
likelihood ratio must increase for all sociable types, by Assumptions 1-3. Moreover,
for any M > 0, if log λi ∈ [−M,M ], this update is bounded uniformly away from
0. For ε > 0, let Bε(λ
∗) be an open ε-ball around λ∗. For sufficiently small ε > 0,
if λ ∈ Bε(λ∗), then observing (L, σL) causes the likelihood ratio to leave Bε(λ∗).
The probability of (L, σL) never occurring converges to 0 as t→ ∞. Therefore, the
likelihood ratio leaves any ε-ball around a non-stationary point almost surely. 2
Proof of Corollary 5. Given Assumption 1, if type θC has a stationary limit
belief, then the support of the limit belief is a subset of {0,∞}. Also, for θC , the
perceived probability of each action is equal to the true probability, ψ̂C = ψ. There-
fore, λC,t is a martingale for any {Θ, π}. By the Martingale Convergence Theorem,
λC,t converges almost surely to a limit random variable λ∞ with supp(λ∞) ⊂ [0,∞).
This rules out incorrect and non-stationary incomplete learning. Therefore, 0 is the
only candidate limit point and it must be that λC,t → 0 almost surely. 2
4.1.3 Proofs of Theorem 5 and 6
Proof of Theorem 5. Assume Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 and suppose ω = R.
Part 1: For any type θ, the function (π̂θ, ρθ) 7→ ψ̂θ(a, σ|ω,λ) is continuous. By
continuity, given δ2 > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that if ||π̂θi − π|| < δ and
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||ρθi − r|| < δ for all sociable types θi, then ||ψ̂i(a, σ|ω, ·) − ψ(a, σ|ω, ·)|| < δ2 for
(a, σ) ∈ {L,R} × {σL, σR}. Thus, δ2 can be chosen to be sufficiently small so that
at every λ ∈ {0,∞}
|γ(λ)− γC(λ)| < min
i,λ∈{0,∞}k
|γi(λ)|/2,
where γC is the corresponding γ for the model where π̂ = π and ρ
θ = r. So δ can
be chosen so that the sign of γ in the misspecified model matches the sign of γC at
all stationary points. Since
γC(λ) =
∑
a,σ
ψ(a, σ,R) log
ψ(a, σ, L)
ψ(a, σ, L)
< 0,
by Theorem 6, learning is complete.
Part 2: Let ε = mini,λ∈{0,∞}k |γi(λ)|/2. There exists a δ > 0 such that if ||rθ −
r|| < δ and ||ρθ−r|| < δ for all types θ, ||F̂L,i−FL|| < δ, and
∣∣π̂θ(ΘA)− π(ΘA)∣∣ < δ
for all sociable types θ such that:
1. The empirical frequency with which autarkic types θ play each action is
|F ω(u)− F̂ ω(ri)−1(ui,
1
2
)| < ε,
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since there always exists a δ sufficiently small such that
||
∫
1− r(p)
r(p)
dF̂L −
∫
1− p
p
dFL|| < ε.
2. For all sociable types, at any stationary λ, the probability of any action is
either 1 or 0 in both the misspecified and correctly specified models.
3. Binary signals imply that the perceived probability of each signal is contin-
uous. At any stationary vector λ, the perceived probabilities of each public
signal satisfies:
|G(σL)− Ĝθ(σL)| < ε.
This implies ψ̂i can be made sufficiently close to ψ at every stationary vector so
that:
||γC(λ)− γ(λ)|| < ε
where γC is γ in the correctly specified model. Therefore, γ has the same sign as
γC for all stationary λ.
By Theorem 6, learning is complete. 2
Proof of Theorem 6. Assume Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 and suppose ω = R. For
any sociable type θi, the mapping (ψ̂i(a, σ|R,λ)) 7→ γ(λ) is continuous, and by the
concavity of the log operator, is negative when ||ψ̂i(a, σ|R, ·) − ψ(a, σ|R, ·)|| = 0.
Therefore, there exists a δi > 0 such that if ||ψ̂i(a, σ|R, ·) − ψ(a, σ|R, ·)|| < δi for
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(a, σ) ∈ {L,R}× {σL, σR}, then γi(λ) < 0 at all stationary vectors. Therefore, any
locally stable point must have λi = 0. This holds for all sociable types θi, so λ = 0
is the unique locally stable point. By Theorem 4, the likelihood ratio converges to
0 almost surely and learning is complete. 2
4.2 Examples of Nested Models
4.2.1 Rabin and Schrag (1999)
Rabin and Schrag (1999) examines individual learning with confirmation bias.
Agents receive a binary signal, but if they receive a signal that goes against their
prior beliefs then with probability q they misinterpret that signal as the other signal
(which agrees with their prior belief). In order to nest this model, a slight exten-
sion must be made to the framework we’ve outlined. In particular, this requires
four public signals and the mapping ρ must be able to map two public signals that
induce the same posterior to different misspecified beliefs. It is straightforward to
extend all arguments made in this paper to this case.
This is a misspecified model with one type θ. There are 4 public signals σL1 , σL2 ,
σR1 , σR2 . All L signals induce same posterior, all R signals induce same posterior.
Conditional on seeing an L signal, σL2 is draw with probability q. Similarly for
σR1 and Pr(σL1 or σL2|ω = R) = Pr(σR1 or σR2 |ω = L) = σ < 1/2. If λ > 1,
then ρ(σL2) = σ and all other signals are interpreted correctly. If λ < 1 then
ρ(σR1) = 1− σ and all other signals are interpreted correctly.
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The parameter q indexes the degree of confirmation bias. The higher q is, the
more likely it is that agents interpret misinterpret signals that go against their prior.
Under this specification,
γ(0) = (1− q)
(
σ log
1− σ
σ
+ (1− σ) log σ
1− σ
)
+ q log
σ
1− σ
.
and
γ(∞) = (1− q)
(
σ log
1− σ
σ
+ (1− σ) log σ
1− σ
)
+ q log
1− σ
σ
.
As q increases, more weight is placed on the last term, which is negative when λ = 0
and positive when λ = ∞.
4.2.2 Epstein et al. (2010)
Epstein et al. (2010) considers an individual learning model where agents over-
weigh beliefs towards the prior or over-weight beliefs to the posterior. Specifically,
an agent with prior p who would update her beliefs to BU instead updates to
(1− α)BU + αp
for some α ≤ 1. When α = 0, this is the correct model, for α > 0 agents overweight
the prior. For simplicity of notation suppose that Pr(σL|ω = R) = Pr(σR|ω = L).
In our framework, this is a model with a single agent type who only receives public
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signal s maps this signal to
ρ(s, p) =
(1− α) s
(1−s)(1−p)+ps + α
1
1−p +
1−2p
1−p
(
(1− α) s
(1−s)(1−p)+ps + α
) ,
with
ρ(s, 1) =
s
(1− α)(1− s) + (1 + α)s
,
which implies that ρ(s, 1) = limp→1 ρ(s, 1).
28
Under this misspecification, whenever an agent with prior pt updates their be-
liefs, the likelihood ratio becomes
λt+1 =
(1− α) pts
(1−s)(1−pt)+pts + αpt
1− (1− α) pts
(1−s)(1−pt)+pts − αpt
.
Therefore the Bayes update is
pt+1 = (1− α)
pts
(1− s)(1− pt) + pts
+ αpt.
Thus the update rule from Epstein et al. (2010) can be represented in our framework.
Under this specification the likelihood ratio update is
λt+1/λt =
(1− α) s
(1−s)(1−pt)+pts + α
(1− α) (1−s)
(1−s)(1−pt)+pts + α
28Epstein et al. (2010) does not identify how signals are interpreted at 0 or 1, since beliefs are
stationary at these points. In order to characterize asymptotic outcomes, the tools developed in
this paper show ho the limit of the update rule as p → 0 or 1 can be used to characterize
asymptotic outcomes of the model in Epstein et al. (2010).
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As p→ 1, the likelihood-ratio update goes to
1
(1− α)1−s
s
+ α
and as p→ 0, the likelihood-ratio update goes to
(1− α) s
1− s
+ α
So in an environment with binary signals σL and σR, Pr(σL|ω = R) = Pr(σR|ω =
L) = σ < .5
γ(0) = σ log[(1− α)1− σ
σ
+ α] + (1− σ) log[(1− α) σ
1− σ
+ α],
and
γ(∞) = σ log 1
(1− α) σ
1−σ + α
+ (1− σ) log 1
(1− α)1−σ
σ
+ α
.
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